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This dissertation is intended to interpret, analyze, and explain the interplay 
between organizational structure and organizational information systems security by 
mapping structural contingency theory into three qualitative studies. The research 
motivation can be attributed in two ways. First, Johnson and Goetz's (2007) conception of 
embedding information in organizations as part of their field research interviewing 
security executives serves as a methodological inspiration for the series of three studies 
reported here.  The point that security should be infused into organization activities 
instead of serving as a "bolted-on" function is a central tenet guiding the development of 
this dissertation. Second, a macro approach is employed in the studies reported here, 
aimed at a theoretical expansion from existing behavioral security studies which typically 
take a micro perspective, while mitigating potential theoretical reductionism due to a 
predominant research concentration on individual components of organizational 
information security instead of the holistic function of the firm. Hence, this dissertation 
contributes to the behavioral organizational security research by positing a theoretical 
construct of information-securing, an organizational security process which is essentially 
characterized by dualism, dynamism, and democratism. With a macro organizational 
perspective on the elements of information securing, organizations can effectively 
discover and leverage organization-wide resources, efforts, and knowledge to cope with 
security contingencies. 
iv 
The first study of this dissertation is designed to investigate the nature of 
employees’ extra-role behaviors. This study investigated how employees might 
sometimes take steps beyond the requirements of the organizational-level security policy 
in order to facilitate effective workgroup operation and to assist less-skilled colleagues. 
The second study of this dissertation conducts an interpretive study of the role of 
information systems auditing in improving information security policy compliance in the 
workplace, with a specific focus on the role of non-malicious insiders who unknowingly 
or innocuously thwart corporate information security directives by engaging in unsafe 
computing practices. The last study of the dissertation explores the interplay between 
organizational structures and security activities. The organizational perspective of 
security bureaucracies is developed with three specific bureaucratic archetypes to define 
the evolutionary stages of the firm’s progress through evolving from coercive rule-based 
enforcement regimes to fully enabled and employee-centric security cultures in the 
workplace.  Borrowing from Weberian metaphors, the characterization of security 
bureaucracies evolving from an “iron cage” to an “iron shield” is developed.   
These three studies revolving around the general notion of information-securing 
are deemed to be a promising start of a new stream of organizational IS security research. 
In order to enrich and extend our IS security literature, the perspective advocated in this 
dissertation suggests a shift in the epistemological paradigm of security behaviors in 
organizations from the prevailing micro views to macro perspectives which will result in 
very useful new perspectives on security management, security behaviors and security 
outcomes in organizations. 
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Securing organizational information assets becomes increasingly important for 
contemporary companies to survive and succeed in the information age, when infinite 
quantities of data are communicable and accessible through the use of information 
systems. Information assets, nevertheless, are more vulnerable to security threats and 
attacks. According to a recent survey report by Gartner Inc. (2017), the forecast of 
worldwide enterprise security spending will reach $96.3 billion in 2018, an 8% increase 
from 2017, as organizations rush to protect themselves from cyber-attacks to achieve 
regulatory compliance, and to instill security awareness in stakeholders as a digital 
corporate strategy. Furthermore, the Ernst & Young Global Information Security Survey 
(2017-2018) indicates that due to the dramatically-expanding threatened landscape, by 
2021, the global cost of cyber security breaches will likely surpass 6 trillion dollars, more 
than double the total for 2015.  
Despite a growing priority for security spending and deployment of state-of-the-
art security technologies, information systems (IS) security is considered to be a complex 
and wide-ranging phenomenon as opposed to a single set of tasks or processes (Crossler 
et al., 2013; Zafar & Clark, 2009). It can be assumed that cyber threats are increasingly 
prevalent in view of the increasing interconnectivity of continually advancing 
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applications, including such recent innovations as the Internet of Things and Cloud 
manufacturing. At the same time, developers and users of emergent technologies fall 
short on corresponding security measures. IS security must become sophisticated in 
response to the combined rise of technological sophistication and increasing security 
exposure.   
There has been extensive research in the area of behavioral security, developing 
characterizations of 1) actors (e.g. insider threat: Posey et al., 2013; Warkentin & 
Willison, 2009; Willison & Warkentin, 2013), 2) activities (e.g. compliance with security 
policies: Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Herath & Rao, 2009a; Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010), and 
3) approaches (e.g. deterrence mechanisms: D'Arcy et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2004; Straub, 
1990). These well-regarded behavioral information security researches have focused 
specifically on activities within the firm. In contrast, little weight has been given to 
behavioral security research that takes a macro-level organizational focus. This lack of 
inquiry into the organizational structures that can enhance and/or exacerbate security 
situations can lead to inefficient theoretical development and can hamper the pursuit and 
understanding of optimal security solutions (Sadok et al., 2014).  
Relevant literature on IS implementations suggests that the match between the 
design of IS and the organizational structure, which is embedded, determines the success 
of the implementation (Leifer, 1988; Markus & Robey, 1983; 1988). Similarly, it can be 
argued that in order to succeed in attaining and maintaining information security, IS 
security must be infused within the organizational structure. In other words, IS security 
has to fit varying organizational structures. As previously seen in the literature, ignoring 
contingency factors such as organizational strategy, structure, culture, size, and 
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environment is likely to lead to conflicts between IS security implementation and the 
organizational system (Weill & Olson, 1989; Raymond, 1990). This can result in a poor 
fit between IS security and the organization it is designed to protect, leading to increased 
severe risks. 
1.1 Dualism, Dynamism, and Democratism in  
Information Security and  
Information Securing 
Structuration theory (originated in Anthony Gidden, a British sociologist’s work 
1979, 1984) is used to address the dilemma of selecting between objective and subjective 
conceptions of organizations, allowing organizations to embrace both perspectives (cf. 
Poole & Van de Ven, 1989; Willmott, 1981). According to Orlikowski (1992), 
structuration is a social process that involves the reciprocal interaction of human agency 
and structural features of organizations. Orlikowski (1992, 2000) extended the 
structuration model in the technology field, developing the well-known conceptualization 
of the “duality of technology.” The duality speaks to how humans use technology while 
engaging in organizational life, while at the same time organizational activities cause 
changes in the technology. In this view, human agency and organizational structure are 
interdependent and coevolving. Hence, technology is interpretively flexible since human 
agents and social-historical contexts interact in the development and use of technology; 
each causes change in the other. The perspective of information-securing is identified in 
this dissertation as a process in which organizational resources, efforts and knowledge 
can be dualistically pooled and leveraged in organizational security regimes, resulting in 
a superior response to security contingencies. Organizational information-securing, 
envisioned as an evolutionary outcome of bureaucratic development of the organizational 
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form, can be viewed in its evolutionary outcome as an open system co-developed by 
entrusted, empowered, and enlightened employees.  
The central premises of information-securing involve dualism, dynamism, and 
democratism, which describe the properties and propensities of the information-securing 
system. Dualism, the first pillar, is derived from structural theory and Orlikowski’s 
structural model of technology, thus delineating the dualistic nature of information-
securing. It encompasses not only objective characteristics of IS security such as security 
technologies and artifacts, but also the human aspect, in terms of policies, standards, and 
procedures. Second, dynamism is brought from contingency theory (e.g. Donaldson, 
1996). Contingencies are defined as any factor that can moderate the effect of an 
organizational characteristic on organizational performance, such as strategy, size, task 
uncertainty, and technology (Donaldson, 2001).  Contingency factors reflect the influence 
of the environment on an organization; an effective organization, as such, has to fit its 
structure internally to the contingency to develop security strategies, technologies, 
policies and rules, and then fit its performance externally to the security environment. 
The last pillar of information-securing, democratism, aims at mitigating the side effects 
of overly bureaucratic organization structures. For example, Perrow’s (1972) accentuated 
rigidity and apathy are the main reason for the compelling rubric of an “iron cage” in 
which coercively-ruled employees work.  
It is difficult for a structurally “rational” policy to outline every possible security 
behavior in anticipation of every possible threat eventuality (e.g. Hsu et al., 2015; Posey 
et al., 2014). Hence, the democracy of information securing should be implemented 
through cross-boundary collaboration and support among various communities of 
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interest, such as security policy-makers, administrators, technicians, and end-users, in 
order to expand organizational flexibility and response to the threats of the security 
landscape. Taken together, dualism sketches the framework of an open, adaptive 
organizational information-securing system, whereas dynamism and democratism 
respectively manifest the system in a temporal perspective, bolstering the organizational 
capability to respond to threats promptly and effectively by broadening security roles and 
responsibilities of human agency within organizations. 
1.2 Theoretical Perspectives of the Dissertation 
This dissertation comprises three independent yet interrelated studies, each of 
which employs a case study methodology. Although the research has been inspired and 
influenced by many classic organizational theories, the main research purpose is to 
explore and explain how and why information security and the information securing 
process are implemented in the firm. As such, the research priority has been to develop 
new theoretical perspectives of information security governance in the firm rather than 
examining existing behavioral security theories. The qualitative method utilized is highly 
appropriate for the inherently social process that information securing is considered to 
entail.  
The studies comprising this dissertation and the evolution of the information 
securing theory are as follows:  
1.2.1 Study 1: Beyond Extra-Role Security 
Behaviors in Large Corporate Settings: 
The Case of "Tribal Security"  
The first study investigates the nature of employee extra-role behaviors, 
considering what transpires when employees go beyond or even act in contraventions of 
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the requirements of the corporate information security policy. Hsu and colleagues (2015) 
found that employees can potentially go beyond the formal requirements of security 
policies, but the construct of extra-role behavior in their studies, directly drawn from 
organizational studies, may neglect important possible security characteristics. In the 
field study upon which Study 1 is based, the investigation was intended to understand 
how employees might sometimes take steps beyond the requirements of the 
organizational-level security policy in order to facilitate effective workgroup operation 
and to assist less-skilled colleagues. Van Dyne and LePine’s (1995) typology of extra-
role behavior served as the theoretical template for the study, seeking instances of the 
characteristics of the stewardship, helping, reporting, and voice behaviors. 
1.2.2 Study 2:  The Role of Internal Audit and 
User Training in Information Security  
Policy Compliance  
The second study undertakes an interpretive investigation of the role of 
information systems auditing and its influence on information security policy compliance 
in firms, with an eye toward identifying security non-compliance in the workplace. In this 
study, noncompliance is investigated in the context of non-malicious insiders who 
unknowingly or innocuously thwart corporate information security directives by 
engaging in seemingly innocent unsafe computing practices. The ameliorative effects of 
auditor-identified training and motivational programs to emphasize pro-security 
behaviors are explored. This study applies qualitative case analysis of technology user 
security perceptions combined with interpretive analysis of depth interviews with 
auditors to examine and explain the rubrics of non-malicious technology user behaviors 
in violations of cyber security directives.    
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1.2.3 Study 3: Iron Cage or Iron Shield?  
A Study of Organizational Information 
Security Bureaucracies  
 The third study is intended to explore the interplay between organizational 
structures and security activities, expanding on the notion of embedding information 
security in organizations (Johnson & Goetz, 2007).   Drawing inspiration from the 
structuration literature which suggests that technologies and users are inextricably 
interlinked (e.g. Hussain & Cornelius, 2009; Jones & Karsten, 2008; Orlikowski, 1992), 
the third study advances the point that information security should be instilled into 
organizational routines and working cultures, achieving what is characterized in this 
dissertation as a state of information securing. Case study methodology is employed, with 
the cooperation of two leading Fortune 500 IT corporations. The emergent notion of 
security bureaucracies is described and three distinctive archetypes of the evolutionary 
stages that such bureaucracies take in the firm are delineated in accordance with 
prerequisite properties of each evolutionary stage. In accordance with Adler and Borys’ 
(1996, 2012) dimensional dichotomy of organizational bureaucracy – consisting of 
coercive properties and enabling properties – study three illuminates the dynamics of the 
evolutionary process that leads to the development of an enabled security bureaucracy in 
the workplace. In evolving from the metaphorical status of a coercive “iron cage” to an 
enabled “iron shield,” firms become wise curators of organizational information assets 
and evolve into rational and “humane” structural systems. 
This dissertation is dedicated to the development of the three studies mentioned 
here. Hence, each study is self-contained within its own chapter, i.e. Chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
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Following the three studies, this dissertation concludes with findings, limitations, and 









BEYOND EXTRA-ROLE BEHAVIORS IN LARGE CORPORATE 





Organizational insiders are the weakest link in the security chain of an 
organization's information system (Crossler et al., 2013; Warkentin & Willison, 2009). 
This raises concerns about controlling the behavior of human agents in the firm and IS 
researchers have devoted substantial efforts to identify and prevent the influence of 
insiders’ counter-productive security behaviors. One area of IS security research focuses 
on the prevention of security policy violations; this falls under the rubric of General 
Deterrence Theory (cf., Cheng et al., 2013; D'Arcy & Herath, 2011; D'Arcy & Hovav, 
2007; Herath & Rao, 2009). An underlying assumption of Deterrence Theory studies is 
that many insiders have negative intentions which must be prevented. Other recent 
research has explored the motivations employees (or, individual technology users) might 
have to engage in pro-security behaviors or to avoid behaviors leading to security threats. 
This research leverages the protection motivation theory perspective (PMT) brought from 
healthcare research to explain how to avoid detrimental behaviors and how to motivate 
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beneficial security activities in the firm (cf., Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Posey et al., 
2015; Vance et al., 2012). Information Security Policy compliance requires employee 
adherence to the formal security guidelines promulgated by the firm (Whitman et al., 
2001), such that employees arrange their work to align with corporate expectations 
(Pahnila et al., 2007).Yet, policies rarely cover all unanticipated circumstances. Based on 
our interpretation of notion of "person-environment fit" (French, 1982; Ayyagari et al., 
2011), we develop two discontinuities between organizational requirements and 
subsequent employee outcomes. One discontinuity regards potential discontinuities 
between security policy requirements and employees’ security knowledge and expertise; 
another discontinuity deals with the lack of fit between security environment demands 
and the quality of security policies (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). In the first case, employees 
could fail to comply with security policies due to the requirements overload, complexity 
of the work, and uncertainty in the environment (D’Arcy et al., 2014). In the second case, 
discontinuities arise when corporations cannot consistently maintain policies that 
correspond with increasing threats in the security ecosystem. In each of these cases, one 
possible response on the part of nonmalicious insiders is to engage in security behaviors 
that go beyond the dictates of the security policy. We call these "extra-role behaviors."  
2.2 Extra-Role Security Behaviors 
 Researchers have known that employees can potentially go beyond the 
requirements of security policies (Hsu et al., 2015). Colvin (2016) called this "non-
malicious policy non-compliance," but this particular notion does not speak directly to 
the idea of employees going beyond their brief for purposes of helping coworkers, as 
opposed to considering non-malicious behaviors from the perspective of the employees' 
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actions, alone. Extra-role security behaviors are conceptually similar to the behaviors that 
might arise from organizational citizenship (Smith et al., 1983), but they are 
operationally distinct -- arising from a sense of empowerment (Spreitzer, 1995) rather 
than notions of altruism (Smith et al., 1983). Van Dyne et al. (1995) offer a typology 
which characterizes extra-role behaviors as residing on a continuum between cooperative 
interpersonal actions (affiliative) vs. change oriented behavior (challenging), or as 
oriented toward either proactive change (promotive) or protective support (prohibitive). 
Demonstrated in Table 1, a key extra-role example in this typology is “Helping,” which 
represents the convergence of the affiliative dimension (interpersonal cooperation) with 
the promotive dimension (proactive assistance) and which results in an outcome that can 
be characterized as emphasizing small acts in support of the work of others (Van Dyne & 
LePine, 1998). This could be construed as tips for how to use a specific security system 
or informal guidance about security policies offered from one employee to another. 
Table 2-1: A Typology of Extra-Role Security Behaviors. 
 Prohibitive Promotive 
Affiliative Stewardship Helping 
Challenging Reporting Voice 
 
 
Another important extra-role behavior is “Stewardship,” which is an affiliative 
approach (i.e., social) and is typically intended to serve as a prohibitive influence against 
inappropriate activities (e.g., protection-oriented). This extra-role behavior often 
manifests as friendly cautions to colleagues regarding potential pitfalls to avoid; this is 
best envisioned as "words to the wise" about appropriate security behaviors informally 
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conveyed between colleagues. “Voice” is the extra-role behavior that proactively 
expresses ideas that are change-oriented, and will usually involve proactive instruction 
from one colleague to another in order to avoid potential security problems. “Reporting” 
is the extra-role behavior that has to do with whistle-blowing or reports to superiors about 
security behaviors in contravention of policy. Unlike the other three approaches which 
are largely supportive, Reporting can potentially damage co-worker relationships (Van 
Dyne & LePine, 1998).  
These various extra-role behaviors and the interaction between various 
organizational perspectives for engaging in one sort of behavior or another are visually 
represented in Figure 2.1. We envision that employees who are security-savvy will seek 
to provide knowledgeable guidance about security threats and solutions to their less-
informed colleagues (stewardship behavior), while employees with managerial expertise 
and supervisory experience will provide similar informed guidance to colleagues 
regarding corporate security policy (also stewardship behavior).  
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Figure 2.1: Extra-Role Security Behaviors. 
We also believe right-minded employees who are non-malicious will be anxious 
to help their company stay well protected from security threats. To that end, frontline 
employees who encounter security anomalies will share their experiences in dealing with 
unusual security problems with the colleagues who are perceived as more security-savvy 
(this extra-role behavior is "voice," involving the sharing of useful information), while 
non-malicious frontline employees who encounter security policy violations will also be 
motivated to pass word of the violations to management (the extra-role behavior of 
"reporting"). 
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2.3 Field Study: Qualitative Focus Research  
With this extra-role behavioral typology in mind, we approached a Fortune 500 
telecommunications company to undertake a qualitative assessment of the typology in a 
workplace context with a focus group consisting of a mixture of security-savvy, 
management savvy and frontline security employees. In the group was a long-time 
security manager responsible for network security in the company's secured 
telecommunications services product line. There were two software engineers and a 
project manager. There was one large group leader and one small team leader also 
represented in the group we interviewed. We spent 45 minutes in focused discussion with 
the group, and (assuring them of confidentiality) initiated probes into characterizations of 
the extra-role behaviors we had conceptualized. 
2.3.1 Initial Probes on Extra Role Security Behaviors  
We initially asked our respondents to consider situations in which there were 
expected security behaviors but where unexpected situational exigencies arose that 
required them to exceed the expected security requirements of the job. We framed this by 
asking them to consider what their job role was in regard to security, essentially voicing 
"how is security part of your job?" They initially spoke to the orthodoxy of corporate 
security requirements, with the telecommunications security manager discussing the 
notion of compartmentalization of data, saying:  
It's like the military; there's certain things you can’t share. We're all exposed 
to a certain amount of private data, but if you don't need to know, I'm not saying 
anything.  
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The large group leader seconded that notion with an anecdote about credit 
card data and the payment system’s restrictions her company follows.  
My department is customer-facing, so PCI applies. Customer authorization 
has to be done before we dispatch a tech out to the field to troubleshoot a 
problem. 
Anybody can call in and troubleshoot their Internet, but you have to be 
authorized before we can send out parts or labor to fix it. 
...the sense being that company protocols were well-known and carefully 
observed. This point was seconded by one of the software engineers:  
As a software developer I see all sorts of things. They need software in every 
sort of domain and locations where there is highly secured data. You have to be 
careful about who you show the data to. There are corporate and federal 
guidelines about that. We take training courses on that all the time. 
It seemed very clear that the group members understood their required security 
behaviors, and were well-trained and well-aware of the information security policy of the 
firm. It also seemed that there was a prevailing view that the internal work product was 
inherently secure by virtue of it being inside the firewall, implying there was not a real 
need to introspect on the safety of a given file opened for work. In the words of the young 
software developer on the team: 
Sometimes you have to VPN in and sign into your session from scratch, and 
you assume when you do that whoever was there last was supposed to be and 
didn’t make any changes they weren’t supposed to do. It's not like there’s a log 
file we go and review before we start working once we sign in. 
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Attempting to steer conversation toward potential extra-role behaviors, we then 
asked, "What sorts of security aspect do you consider not your job? What sorts of things 
go beyond what you consider is expected of you, security-wise? And, on that topic, we 
wonder when you might go the extra mile and help somebody with something that's not 
really part of your official purview?" Our desire, here, was to get them to speak to extra-
role security behaviors, particularly the stewardship sort that involved helping others 
above and beyond the job description. 
You're asking what would motivate someone to help someone else be more 
secure? 
...was the question in response from the young software engineer, who continued 
with a fascinating anecdote about social engineering and the lack of real concern about it 
in some cases: 
...it's one of those things you see every day, people will open the door for 
anybody. The UPS guy walks up, dressed in his UPS uniform. If I don't hold the 
door for him, it's generally considered rude. I think there are social ramifications 
for being secure. If I go to Suzy and say, "You shouldn't put your password on 
sticky notes," she's probably going to be upset, or not listen. There's a lot of 
training needed to overcome that.  
To which we noted, "Everybody knows there are workarounds. We use them 
all the time." 
If a co-worker was using a workaround and you knew it was against policy, what 
would your motivations be to stay silent, or else to report it?" We likened this to the felt 
motivation to "hold the door" for colleagues even though “piggybacking” through 
17 
security checkpoints were against formal company policy. We characterized it as trying 
to "live in the real world," where security is one thing and getting the job done is another. 
The telecommunications security manager told us, in response: 
I have access to a whole bunch of servers, and the way I have the access is 
that I "backdoored" everything. But the information that I access on them has 
been deemed as essential to what my team does, so there are exceptions written so 
that I could maintain access. 
We rejoined: "So, you had permission for backdoor access? To which, he 
answered... 
Not originally. I got in it because I needed the information. 
And, to which the other manager in the group interjected: 
But your manager was cool with it. 
2.3.2 Dropping A-Priori Expectations;  
 Engaging in Post-Hoc Opportunities 
It was at this point that we realized that our orthodox investigation into extra-role 
security behaviors had taken an unexpected and illuminative twist. We were carefully 
steering the respondents toward a discussion of non-malicious extra-role security 
behaviors, expecting we might hear accounts of how one worker helped another come up 
with a good password, or how one particularly skilled individual might suggest a security 
solution that had not occurred to the group. Instead, what we were hearing about were 
activities that were, on the one hand, in clear violation of the overarching corporate 
security policy (building informal backdoor access to servers or holding the door for the 
UPS guy), but were, on the other hand, undertaken by workgroup members with the 
implicit understanding that the actions facilitated "getting the job done" in a very busy 
18 
workplace. Excusable expediency might be a good characterization of the notion we were 
beginning to perceive. The young programmer had an illuminating clarification on the 
notion: 
I think you have to analyze the level of risk with that. If Suzy’s going to get 
fired for a sticky note on the computer, I'm probably not as keen to report her for 
that as if she just got suspended for one day. 
To that end, there appeared to be situational exigencies to the notion of policy 
violations and the extra-role behavior of "reporting." It clearly was bounded by implicit 
considerations of whether the activity was innocuous or truly threatening. In the case of 
mundane things like holding the door or using sticky note passwords, there was no 
exigency in favor of reporting the violation, whereas when the potential violation was of 
a more discernibly serious nature, it would be different, as the project manager in the 
group noted: 
A lot of the data I work with is financial data, and I think I would be heavily 
motivated to turn in someone who messed with that. 
As the programmer pointed out, however, much of this was mediated by in-group 
cultural norms implicitly conveyed by work group membership: 
I generally trust the people around me. I feel it's relatively safe here; 
strangers can’t get into this building easily. I don't think anyone in my group is 
going to try to go on Suzy's computer and get in, so the risk there is not big, you 
know? A sticky note on the panel; [it is] not a big deal. I think the other side of 
that is if server access was emailed out, or passwords emailed. 
Whereupon the other programmer interjected:  
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That brings up another point; where I used to work, we had a place where 
password lists were taped up to the wall. Just for everyone to see. Where I work 
now, if we did that, if someone walked by and saw I had a password up, they're 
going straight to my manager. 
There was the clear implication that rules for informal security behavior were 
situational to the group one belonged to, and were implicit within the group as a part of 
its culture for getting work done. This reminded us of Ouch’s (1980) notion of the "Clan" 
as regards workplace norms, although the workgroups in question were far too small to 
be considered "clannish." We opted, instead, for the thematic rubric of "Tribe," to 
connote the internal cohesiveness among small, tightly-knit workgroups on implicit and 
informal security policies promulgated in favor of work efficiency (and, not 
inconsequentially, in contravention of corporate level policies). In an Ouchi-esque clan, 
employees are permitted a high degree of operational latitude with the belief by top 
management that relying on commonly-held goals and behavioral expectations inherent 
in the firm, the culture would produce the desired strategic outcomes. What we had 
encountered here was nothing like that: to be certain, the notion of operational latitude 
was present, but the recognition that it was exercised as a prerogative of the workgroup in 
seeming contravention of corporate or societal norms (unlike in clan organizational 
forms) is what differentiates the concepts we had encountered. 
2.4 A Nascent Theory of Tribal Security 
"Tribe" tends to connote nicely the sort of group that holds its own council on 
matters of internal exigency, while insulating insider members from outsider 
introspection in regards to rules for operational propriety. We coin the term "Tribal 
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Security" to connote this reliance on internal workgroup norms in the face of external 
corporate standard on cybersecurity, and observe that,  as with tribal affiliations, loosely 
grouped federations of tribes can also cohere under overarching considerations of 
common good, which speaks to the explicit realization among this group of workers that 
"doing it their way" was just for in the group, but that everybody at the company also had 
a common duty to secure the corporate assets against intrusion and violation. 
We had discovered the workgroup culture of the workaround and were discerning 
the intricacies of its operation, limits and capabilities as a part of this unexpected turn that 
our focus group session had taken. It was at this point that we opted to abandon the 
original purposes for the session of exploring conventional extra-role behaviors as 
theorized a-priori, and expand upon the serendipitous discovery of the Tribal Security 
rubric we had discovered, post-hoc. We asked our respondents to expand on why they 
worked this way, and one programmer in the group noted, 
A lot of it [has to do with] the personality of who you get along with. A lot of 
it, too, is what your group is, who your co-workers are, who your manager is, 
what you’ve been trained to do. 
To which the engineer in the room retorted: 
So, what you're saying is there's corporate policy and then there’s individual 
policy? 
And, the group manager confirmed: 
Yes; it's very much departmental. 
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The point of Tribal cohesion and the culture of the in-group, facilitating 
workgroup efficacy while still protecting corporate assets at a reasonable level, was put 
this way by a programmer: 
We're never going to report someone on our team for doing something unless 
it’s egregious. We'll handle it internally. 
We were nonplussed, and sought to make sense of this unexpected turn in the 
discussion. We sought clarity in the notion of informal violations of corporate norms as 
part of workgroup culture, and asked for clarification: "Help us to understand the group 
that had the post-it notes all over the wall," to which the group leader in the room pointed 
out: 
They're making changes everywhere, logging into things quickly. They are 
actively moving customers, actively doing work with customers. No time to stop. 
The notion of expediency for the Tribe but safety for the larger Clan was 
explicated in this notion from one of the programmers in regards to workarounds: 
If I know for a fact that we're in a secure environment, I'm a software developer 
trying to push a code out. If it's going to be secure in production, but if we're in 
development or testing, first, I don't mind backdooring stuff during development to get 
results immediately. I would not do that in production. 
2.5 Discussion: Emergent Theorization on  
Workgroup Security Norms 
What we come to in this research, through the unexpected revelations of the focus 
group in which we fully expected to explore mundane and innocuous helping behaviors, 
is the notion of security existing at two key levels in the firm: the implicit rules of day-to-
day expediency governed by workgroup culture (the Security Tribe) and the explicit 
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policies of the larger corporation in which the workgroups are embedded (The Cyber 
Clan). It flies in the face of conventional theorization of security policy compliance, 
where it is largely presumed that the policies of the firm are widely known and are either 
strictly followed or egregiously violated and that the role of enforcement is to detect, 
protect and prevent as it regards to policy violations. It stretches credulity to consider that 
the security managers of the firm in question are not at least tangentially aware of the 
workgroup cultures that are in play in the company headquarters. Surveillance at this 
company is pervasive and effective; there are cameras everywhere, and outsiders cannot 
get in without close scrutiny.  
It is for this reason that, in Figure 2.2, we represent the scheme we have 
encountered as a number of Tribes embedded in a greater Clan structure. Recall, clans, 
per Ouchi (1980) permit a certain loose interpretation of norms and requirements in favor 
of reliance that the worker's improvisations around the strict rules of the workplace will 
inevitably support the overarching corporate strategy for business objectives. 
Notwithstanding, we cannot be certain of this. Hence, we provisionally characterize the 
case we are analyzing as one of Tribes within a Clan, and intend to seek careful 
illumination going forward as to the perceptions of the managers of the company in 
question in terms of the permissibility of such Tribal structures within the overarching 
corporate context. 






Figure 2.2: Security Tribes and Cyber Clans. 
2.6 Conclusion 
For now, it is sufficient to remark upon a highly unexpected outcome that tends to 
provide a contrasting point to orthodox theoretical expectations drawn from existing 
security research. We see in our study of a Fortune 500 telecommunications company 
that technologists in a highly secure and vital operation have Tribal norms for security at 
the workgroup level that permit looser and freer interpretations of the formal corporate 
security policy, all in the name of workplace efficiency. We are not certain if this is a 
conventional outcome, or if it could be expected to cohere in other corporate contexts. As 
to whether this finding might obtain in other contexts is an open question, as a qualitative 
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inquiry, we are well aware that our results can only generalize to theory, and not to 
external circumstances (Miles & Huberman, 1994). To that end, we conclude by 
introducing our notional theory of Tribal Security as a putative counterpoint, subject to 
expansion and verification, to the orthodox considerations of information security policy 
compliance enforced by either deterrence mechanisms or protection motivation precepts 
in large companies. We understand the efficacy of such approaches; they are sound and 
based upon extensive testing. However, deep interpretive assessment of workgroup 
cultural norms can provide new perspective from which to view long-standing theoretical 
expectations, and that seems to be the case here. 
We fully intend to investigate this idea further, in different managerial levels of 
the company in question and across other companies in different industries, for a ready 
point of comparison. The potential implications are too important to ignore or let lie. As 
of now, this is merely a provisional theory born on the strength of a significant case study 
of a large technology company, but it is still a single instance and, as such, a starting 
point for a new avenue of inquiry into the cultural norms of workgroup security in the 









THE ROLE OF INTERNAL AUDIT AND USER TRAINING IN 





In the process of assuring compliance with corporate information assurance 
objectives, the Information Security Policy, commonly called the ISP, is a primary 
document for purposes of planning and guiding secure operations among technology 
users (Anon, 1992; Corbitt, 1992; Knapp et al., 2009).  It is also an important benchmark 
for IS auditing (Vroom & Solms, 2004), and can serve as a baseline in audits against 
which improvements in IS Security can be suggested.  Auditors are well advised to look 
to the degrees to which the Information Security Policy is either observed or avoided by 
company technology users, in terms of understanding the readiness of corporate 
technology users to engage in pro-security behavior and in regards to offering 
suggestions for improvements to Enterprise Risk Management approaches that depend 
upon user buy-in and compliance (Pathak, 2005; Spears & Barki, 2010).  
Much research exists on the threats that malicious or deviant insiders play in 
opposition to good information security, and a popular undercurrent of criminology-
based theories of cybersecurity has dominated the research (cf., Hannaford, 1995; Hu et 
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al., 2011). It is true that there are criminals within companies who perpetrate malicious 
acts against corporate security. It is equally true that a certain portion of the insider threat 
arises from well-meaning but all-the-same noncompliant technology users (Theoharidou 
et al., 2005; Warkentin & Willison, 2009). It is the non-malicious insider and the ways in 
which audits can help to ameliorate the problem that forms the research question central 
to this paper: 
How can auditors identify and contribute to the correction of non-malicious 
insider threats to cybersecurity in the firm?  
There is a critical area of emerging inquiry that highlights the cybersecurity 
problems that companies face from well-meaning but non-compliant technology users. In 
ensuring that audit processes result in the best possible outcomes for companies, one 
important step is to educate complacent and nonchalant technology users about the sheer 
necessity of adhering to the corporate Information Security Policy, even if they think they 
are safe in not doing so. A key audit role, aside from the obvious process of identifying 
and neutralizing bad actors, should be to identify the non-malicious technology user who 
is in need of training and motivation toward pro-security behaviors. Information security 
awareness is an important part of an overall cybersecurity plan in the firms (Bulgurcu et 
al., 2010; Pahnila et al., 2007), and a greater emphasis on training and motivation are the 
key to achieving this end (Warkentin & Willison, 2009). However, successful awareness 
programs require capable auditor assistance in the identification of the users in need of 
counseling in regards to policy adherence (Vroom & Solms, 2004). The educated and 
motivated technology user is the firm's most effective deterrent against threats (D'Arcy & 
Hovav, 2007), but education and training are of no use if the users in need of it cannot be 
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clearly identified. This is the role of auditors in the increasingly security-centric world of 
business: identifying the gaps between organizational security expectations and the 
mundane daily work practices that do not always reconcile with directives.  
This article outlines the notion of CyberComplacency and Cybersecurity Loafing 
as non-malicious but potentially harmful activities on the part of technology users who 
feel unadvisedly secure in their operation of certain technology protocols and platforms 
which are popularly but inappropriately considered to be secure from exploits, or in the 
routine abrogation of ISP requirement in the name of workplace efficiency. The intention 
is to offer new directions for IS audit that considers the less dramatic but by no means 
innocuous non-malicious activities that threaten corporate information security.  
3.1.1 The Insider Threat 
In the firms, the technology user is widely considered the weakest link in any 
cybersecurity regime (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Hu et al., 2011; Warkentin & Willison, 
2009). Technology implementations serve to secure the hardware and software side of 
cybersecurity in the firm, while Information Security Policies exist to guide user behavior 
and direct security compliance in accordance with corporate requirements (Anon, 1992). 
Yet, the prevailing fear is that such policies are honored as often in the breach as the 
observance, leading to a robust research tradition on the nature of the “insider security 
threat” (Hu et al., 2011; D’Arcy & Hovav, 2007; Theoharidou et al., 2005; Warkentin & 
Willison, 2009). To that end, IS audit functions might focus on how the firm ensures that 
technology users adhere to security standards and engage in appropriate security 
behaviors (Abu-Musa, 2008; Bednar et al., 2013; Sharkasi, 2015; Steinbart et al., 2013), 
or at least inappropriate security behaviors are identified and remediation plans are 
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provided for (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; ISACA, 2016). To that end, the increasingly 
consultative role of IS auditors in the corporate management of IS security is an 
important innovation (Steinbart et al., 2013; Vroom & Solms, 2004). 
While characterizations of threats to IS security have been cataloged into 
taxonomies of insider and outsider sources, spanning both malicious and unintentional 
sorts (Theoharidou et al., 2005; Warkentin and Willison, 2009), the prevailing view in 
behavioral IS security research is that the significant threat to counter is the malicious 
insider (considered the “high grade” threat), contrasted to the little attention given to “low 
grade” accidental, forgetful or careless non-malicious insider behavior  (Warkentin & 
Willison, 2009, p. 101). This approach of ignoring the non-malicious insider while 
focusing on the threat of malicious actors in the firm seems short-sighted, since recent 
field and lab studies have suggested the existence of a potent and potentially disastrous 
“high-grade” insider threat arising from non-malicious activity, and this is the focus of 
this paper:  the role of internal audit in countering the alarming rise and increasing impact 
of non-malicious insider security threats.  
3.1.2 Rubrics for Non-malicious Insiders 
The rubrics devised to characterize the nature of the rising non-malicious insider 
threat in the firm are CyberComplacency and CyberSecurity Loafing, each of which 
refers to a non-malicious insider threat arising from seemingly innocuous and potentially 
innocent behaviors, not intended to harm the firm but potent in their implications for 
security problems, none-the-less. Audit considerations, like IS Security research, likely 
gives unintentional priority to the obvious threat of the malicious insider in seeking to 
prevent fraud, malfeasance and criminal exploits -- as is only proper. Those inside the 
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company who bear the firm ill-will are highly dangerous. Yet, the rising threat of the 
nonchalant or oblivious insider, bumbling into security problems without malicious 
intent, also deserves specific consideration, subsequent identification and, in the specific 
case of audit strategies, the suggestion of effective remediation techniques. Accordingly, 
any well-considered IS audit function would rightly consider the role that user training, 
education, motivation and compliance plays in supporting corporate information security 
policies (ISACA, 2016), both for the ill-intentioned and the well-intentioned technology 
user.   
The paper proceeds as follows:  first, the interactive nature of IS audit and the 
Information Security Policy is discussed, followed by a comparison of several sorts of 
insider threats that security policies are meant to control. Then, we introduce several case 
studies from the lab and from field research on motivations of technology users which 
demonstrate the potent nature of CyberSecurity Loafing and CyberSecurity 
Complacency. Having illustrated case studies of each sort of significant non-malicious 
insider threat, we then provide analysis drawn from a series of in-depth interviews with 
trained auditors analyzed through NVivo 11 Qualitative Analysis software (QSR, 2017) 
in order to identify and elaborate on the ways in which auditing can contribute to solving 
cybersecurity problems arising from user CyberComplacency in the workplace. 
3.2 IS Audit and IS Security:  Catching the Thieves  
or Minding the Store?  
The audit of IS security functions is about determining the goodness of preventive 
regimes and the identification of lapses in remedial measures arrayed against security 
policy infractions. Better put, audit objectives focus on substantiating that internal 
controls exist to minimize business risks and that they function as expected.  The 
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"prevention, detection and correction" of undesirable events is the substance of the IS 
Audit process (ISACA, 2016, p. 46), and this minds one quite a bit of "catching the 
thieves," versus structuring a work environment in which compliance and pro-security 
behavior would be the expected cultural norm and non-phenomenal outcome (i.e., 
"minding the store").To be sure, the overwhelming focus on malicious insiders as both a 
business imperative and an overarching research perspective (e.g., Hu et al., 2011) augurs 
for a theft deterrence default to IS Security and subsequent audits of the process. 
Catching bad guys tends to predominate over the less obtrusive notion of educating the 
clueless, so to speak.  Yet, if an unobtrusive, innocuous, seemingly innocent and well-
intended bumbling employee poses a significant threat to the firm and the security of its 
IS assets, this, too, should rise to predominance in the audit process. Minding the store 
should be an important consideration, notwithstanding the potent threat that potential bad 
guys behind the firewall do, indeed, offer.  
 The telling point in the matter is that deterrence methods designed to prevent 
potential malicious insider behavior and compel Information Security Policy compliance, 
and which are based on theories of criminology (i.e., Hannaford, 1995; Theoharidou et 
al., 2005), are found not to be all that effective when investigated in scientific settings 
(Hu et al., 2011). In fact, it would seem that good user training is far more effective than 
the deterrence-theory-related sanctions regimes (D'Arcy & Hovav, 2007, p. 116; 
Theoharidou et al., 2005, p. 483), and that leads us to a primary conclusion:  while the 
burgeoning data presence in modern firms coupled with the rising legislative initiatives 
for regulatory compliance lead to constant challenges for the IS audit function (Dzuranin 
& Malaescu, 2016; Sharkasi, 2015), the most effective avenues for ensuring successful IS 
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Security lie in better motivated, more educated users (e.g. D'Arcy & Hovav, 2007). To 
that end, IS Audit could profitably focus on expanding its brief to ensure that effective 
training programs are in place and that mindful users are recruited to them, regardless of 
the more orthodox detection, prevention and correction protocols typically assessed. 
3.3 Loafing and Complacency: Potent Insider Threats,  
Frequently Overlooked 
 In considering the several forms of non-malicious insider security threats, 
industry case studies are a useful tool:  they are illustrative and rich in detail about 
specific situations and capable of providing detailed explanation of complex phenomena. 
Two specific case studies are utilized here to provide the basis for demonstrating the 
rubrics of CyberComplacency and Cybersecurity Loafing. One case arose from a 
neurocognitive lab study of computer user responses to security threats, and consisted of 
structured interviews with 116 subjects. The other case involved a Fortune 500 company 
in which a focus group was conducted with 8 workgroup colleagues in a technology 
department, as well as a structured interview with the company Chief Security Officer. 
These are contrasted with in-depth interviews with internal auditors in order to arrive at 
ameliorative strategies for complacent user technology behaviors. 
3.4 The Case of the CyberComplacent Technology User 
 In the process of conducting a neurocognitive study of computer user reactions to 
security threats, we encountered a serendipitous outcome related to non-malicious user 
security non-compliance. A subset of the lab subjects engaged in the study displayed 
reactions to security threat stimuli that were entirely unexpected and seemingly a-
theoretical:  some users, when presented with a potent security threat scenario, reacted in 
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an overly nonchalant and unconcerned manner, inconsistent with a-priori expectations.  
The neurocognitive facility in which we operated is designed for direct researcher 
observation of participants, which facilitated both neurocognitive data collection and 
unobtrusive focus group operation alike. The lab suite featured data collection rooms 
equipped with specialized computer software and biometric sensors for collecting 
quantitative data observations of subject skin conductance, electro encephalography, 
pulse rate, facial expression analysis, pupillometry and eye tracking, all of which provide 
excellent autonomic nervous system benchmarks of threat response in subjects and which 
can be monitored in real time. In addition, sensor rooms were also overseen by a control 
room equipped with two-way mirrors and video camera feeds whereby the researcher 
could observe the subject completing screen-delivered stimuli while wired for collection 
of biometrics. 
3.4.1 The Mac Factor 
This unique combination of visual and sensor monitoring of subjects during the 
administration of computer threat scenarios permitted very accurate and detailed 
identification of response patterns through the combination of two-way mirrors, video 
camera feeds and live sensor waveforms on the researcher’s control room computer. It 
was through this combination of highly accurate subject observational venues that we 
noticed the oddities of subjects who did not react to a threat scenario that had been 
reliably developed to elicit a fear response, if only at autonomic levels. A certain group of 
subjects exhibited neither visual nor sensor waveform responses to the threat scenario 
that was presented. After several occurrences, we took the initiative to ask subjects about 
this lack of response during experimental debriefing. The response was fascinating:  a 
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good deal of the non-reactive subjects were users of the Apple Macintosh computer, and 
were of the definite opinion that cybersecurity threats did not concern them because the 
computer they operated was secure from exploits. Dubbing this “The Mac Factor,” we 
rapidly revised our experimental protocols to include a standard debrief step of asking 
whether the user owned an Apple computer or not, and probing for security concerns in 
the event that they did. A field recorder was used to record the debriefing interviews for 
later analysis, and it was determined that fully one-third of subjects were Mac users and 
that they were, as a generality, largely unconcerned about security threats. It was the 
realization of the seeming inviolability of the computing platform they used that led to 
the consideration that such users would be generally unconcerned with security policy 
requirements related to personal computer or workstation security, and we began to 
characterize this tendency as “CyberComplacency.” 
Our sense was that the CyberComplacent computer user would be less concerned 
about ISP provisions designed to secure the workstation computer because they had the 
secure belief that their computer was not vulnerable to threats. Certainly, sophisticated 
security experts are well aware of the exploits that Apple computers actually face, and 
that the only real protection Mac users can expect is that of being an under-represented 
fraction of the total computer user universe (the “fewer targets” logic of protection). Yet, 
this CyberComplacency tendency could be highly problematic in users, regardless of 
whether they operated a Mac computer on the job or not, as long as they did so in their 
personal life since security compliance patterns become largely habitual over time 
(Vance et al., 2012; Pahnila et al., 2007). If a user is in the habit of feeling secure from 
exploits, owing to the platform choice he or she has made for home computing (or, even 
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those chosen for work), this false sense of security will carry over to all parts of 
computing life via habituation in regard to lax-security computing promoted by their 
personal platform choices.  
The CyberComplacent computer user represents a “stealth” threat to 
organizational information security, and our view is that auditors should be trained to 
recognize, identify and remediate such tendencies in the service of reducing corporate 
exposure to non-malicious insider security threats. The question is:  what sorts of things 
can auditors do to identify and remediate this subtle threat to security? 
3.4.2 The Corporate Shield 
One other form of CyberComplacency was noted in the lab study once our 
debriefing process expanded to a formal process.  Subsequently, each subject was 
debriefed and asked about personal computer use, and their reactions to the threat stimuli 
of the study. A certain portion of the Windows-based computer users in the study also 
exhibited a noticeable nonchalance about security threats, and debrief interviews sought 
to determine why this might be the case. It turned out that some Windows users were also 
unconcerned about security threats because they worked for well-known Fortune 500 
technology companies and expected that their employers had excellent cybersecurity 
implementations upon which they could rely; it was their reasoned point that the 
company implementation served to protect them from exploits, even when they did not 
fully engage in pro-security ISP-compliant behaviors. "The company has my back," is the 
rubric we developed for this unusual response, and the realization was that this degree of 
CyberComplacency might be even more dangerous than The Mac Factor response 
because it involved a more direct realization of platform-based vulnerability, combined 
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with an unreasonable expectation that specific user involvement in cybersecurity 
protocols was not required, owing the excellence of the technological security 
implementations by their employer.  
Personal attitudes about security are formative in the motivation for and 
engagement in pro-security behaviors consistent with ISP requirements (Bulgurcu et al., 
2010; Goodlove, 2001). It has long been known that cybersecurity regimes that rely on 
technical controls, alone, are inadequate to protect firms (Pedayachee, 2012), and to this 
end, it is our expectation that an important role for "consultative IS auditors" (e.g., 
Steinbart et al., 2013) is to identify and remediate both platform-based and 
implementation-based CyberComplacency in the firm.   
 In this case, users who assume that corporate security protections insulate them 
from exploits might be easier for auditors to identify and guide, as these users are reliant 
upon the corporate security implementation and are simply not going beyond it to engage 
in pro-security behaviors as an enhancement of security practices on the job. Identifying 
and auditing user compliance to the corporate security standards is an easy step for 
auditors, and they need only expand their internal controls investigation one step further 
to determine if users are relying solely on the security controls in place, or if they are 
taking further steps beyond the corporate controls in place to engage in personal security 
protections in the form of pro-security behaviors in support of the corporate standards. 
3.5 The Auditor’s Role in Identifying Complacency  
Our view is that IS auditors should be oriented toward seeking the problems 
related to complacent users, identifying causal factors of complacency and providing 
consultative support to remediating the complacent user threats to corporate security. In 
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exploring this notion through qualitative depth interviews with a group of professional 
auditors (three professional accountants specializing in auditing, and a business professor 
who teaches auditing), and also through interpretive textual analysis from a recent 
symposium on the topic (e.g., Islam et al., 2017), we gained a better understanding of the 
day-to-day practices of the auditor which can contribute to identifying and remediating 
the complacency issues that serve as a largely unrecognized threat to corporate IT 
security. Leveraging the qualitative analysis software NVivo 11(QSR, 2017), we 
compiled a series of thematic data coding from which meaning-laden statements from our 
respondents were extracted from the interview data to support interpretive analysis. 
 From this analysis, we gained the sense that during an IT audit, the discerning 
capability of the auditor simply to be aware of the surroundings can lead to some 
potential problem identification and solution recommendations, as one auditor pointed 
out: 
The primary purpose is for us to design an effective audit and to highlight where 
[the] risks might be. I'm asking things informally for my own information and to see 
where the risks might be and also to make suggestions. 
There is a part in the audit where you talk to the employees; we call it a 
walkthrough. They talk to us and tell us what they do; that would be a control test. Our 
visual inspection identifies problems. 
Or, as another auditor put it: 
The auditors come to the office and talk to each employee; they ask them about 
the rules [which they are required to follow] and how they did their work. 
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 It is in this “walkthrough” process of the audit that the auditors learn what should 
be happening and identify which behaviors are deviating from the normative 
expectations.  However, a walkthrough is only a starting point for observation and 
potential problem identification. More formalized approaches take place later in the audit 
process when users are directly engaged: 
You look at the policies the firm has for [computer users]. Usually [auditors] see 
if [the] policy is being followed through structured interviews with the client. 
They would conduct interviews with employees, and then look at browsing 
histories, look at [server logs], see if employees are accessing web sites that might have 
malicious content. 
 Also, in the process, the auditor can begin to discern specific security practices 
that have direct bearing on a corporate well-being: 
…it could be where data backups are stored [or not stored], how often passwords 
are changed, whether they are required to be changed, do people keep their passwords 
written down somewhere in their office… 
As part of identifying security for client considerations, the auditor is tasked with 
noting problematic business practices that might lead to a greater threat exposure in the 
firm. As part of our qualitative analysis of the auditor tasks in supporting cybersecurity 
governance, we engaged in a two-tiered coding process of our interview data: 1) open 
coding, where we initially identified interpretive nodes of meaning from the transcribed 
interviews with auditors followed by 2) axial coding, where we arranged open codes in 
groups of thematic similarity and shared meaning (Saldaña, 2015). In this case, when 
looking into interview passages that indicated where auditors could support the 
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development of better cybersecurity practices, we noted two key initial themes in open 
coding: “interviews” and “understanding.”  
Indicative of the overall process of “Problem Identification” (our axial code for 
the two coded groups of transcript entries under “interviews” and “understanding”), 
Figure 3.1 demonstrates that the combined process of seeking an understanding of the 
client information handling processes coupled with engaging in probing interviews with 
the client workers to identify problem areas were the workflows that auditors leveraged 
to identify nascent cybersecurity problems in the firm.    
 
 
Figure 3.1: Problem Identification Tag Cloud. 
One might assume, for instance, that chronic problems of cybersecurity operation 
would lead to repetitive appearance of certain threats. It is much a consideration of “event 
versus process” in terms of using auditor guidance to remediate the issues:  knowing what 
sorts of exploits the company currently faces is one thing, but being able to identify the 
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underlying causes of the threats (Problem Identification) is even more important to 
prevent repetitive reappearances. To that end, we consider that problem identification to 
be a critical process for IT auditors engaged in cybersecurity analysis to engage in. 
The semantic content of the aspects of auditor threat identification procedures and 
processes is represented in Figure 3.2 below in a tag cloud produced on the specific 
aspects of cybersecurity threats related to complacency problems. The open codes of this 
content area were “security,” “technology,” and vulnerabilities,” and the thematic axial 
code overarching these three open codes was “Threat Identification.” As with the prior 
area of interpretation, Problem Identification, the auditor's watchfulness during site visits 
is well-emphasized, but semantic content related to areas where threats promulgate is also 
noticeable:   employees and the way they managed their desks was quite notable, as were 
the company policies for proper security, password use, computer access, etc. 
 
Figure 3.2: Threat Identification Tag Cloud. 
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What our respondents had to say on the matter was instructive: 
…each employee becomes a potential entry point into the system. 
…look at who can access the computers, and who can transport data from the 
computers. 
…look at the log, see if employees are accessing web sites that might have 
malicious content. 
It was our interpretation of these comments that security threats to the firm were 
as likely to arise from inappropriate activities of the employees as any specific external 
breach attempt. This is in keeping with the hacker’s conventional wisdom that it is 
always easier to socially engineer an intrusion than to force a way in across a well-
constructed security implementation (Mitnick & Simon, 2011). To that extent, the IT 
auditor’s job is as much human relations as it is surveillance, inasmuch as auditors are the 
ones who are truly skilled in seeking and identifying these employee weak points in 
corporate IT operations. Also, it seems clear, just as is often noted in the literature, that 
the auditors we spoke with consider that the computer users are the weakest link in 
cybersecurity implementations. 
3.6 Security Tribes and Compliance Clans: The Case of  
Workgroup Security "Workarounds" 
Our case study analysis informed two different views of security issues related to 
the non-malevolent insider. One, the CyberComplacent user, arises from nonchalance and 
over-reliance upon putatively “secure” technology. The other arises from workers who 
are trying to be expedient in regards to the achievement of work tasks and take 
unwarranted and unsecure shortcuts, albeit in well-meaning ways.  
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It is one thing for computer users to be complacent in their cybersecurity 
perceptions and ISP compliance behaviors; in that they believe the technology they 
utilize is relatively secure from exploit. It can be reasoned that, to a certain extent, one's 
Macintosh is more secure than a PC at several levels, and that also Fortune 500 security 
implementations are very good, indeed. That would not excuse laxity, of course, but it 
might certainly provide a level of understanding for the tendency. The good intentions of 
such CyberComplacent users provides a basis for "salvage" that puts this category of 
employee apart from those who simply do not care, or those who are actively malicious.  
Auditors can seek to identify such employees for specialized training to reinvigorate their 
dedication to pro-security behaviors, despite the protections that computing platforms and 
technological implementations might seem to provide. After all, understanding the 
seemingly irrational behavior of technology users is a key contribution that the audit 
process can provide to corporate cybersecurity (Bednar et al., 2013).  
The case of employees who obviate ISP principles knowingly in the service of 
workplace efficacy is a totally different problem that companies face and which audit can 
also help remediate. We coin the term "Cybersecurity Loafing" to characterize these 
situations:  drawn from the social loafing literature of psychology (Latane et al., 1979; 
Simms & Nichols, 2014). Social loafing characterizes the tendency of some workers to 
hide substandard efforts behind the shield of more productive group activities. "You 
won't get caught if you can't be identified," is the operative logic, and when technology 
workers mask ISP non-compliance behind the greater presence of the organization as a 
whole, it can be considered a form of social loafing which we characterize as 
Cybersecurity Loafing. It need not be the case that workers are attempting to hide 
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laziness behind the greater group of compliant coworkers; as long as the consideration of 
the individual is that his or her non-compliance will be hard to detect in the larger group, 
it is an instance of Cybersecurity Loafing. 
3.6.1 Auditing the Clan 
Auditors are more used to the process of identifying and remediating security 
practices that go against policy, well-meaning or not. In the case of informal workgroup 
cultures that undermine the overall corporate security practices, the sense from our group 
of auditors was that: 
In IT auditing, [auditors] try to help the company be safe. To reduce their risk 
from attacks, they need to teach them first, and then audit them to make sure they are 
following the rules. 
Integrated reporting seeks to create disclosure of all value creation activities at a 
firm and another type of information that is becoming part of the discussion about 
disclosures concerns the level of security over cyber infrastructure. The ultimate focus of 
this disclosure is the firm’s security over data. 
3.7 To Loaf or not to Loaf:  It is a Rational Choice 
Rational choice theory (e.g., Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Li et al., 2010) supports the 
notion that technology users in the firm will frequently contrast or trade off their 
motivations for compliance with ISP requirements against their own personal motivations 
and economic imperatives, and “getting the job done” is a frequent justification for 
working around ISP requirements (e.g., Warkentin & Willison, 2009). In the case of a 
large Fortune 500 company in which we conducted a detailed focus group on the nature 
of “extra-role behaviors” (security activities that go above and beyond standard security 
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requirements), an unexpected realization was that workgroup cultural norms frequently 
provided for implicit in-group approval of security workarounds in the name of achieving 
work objectives on time and on budget. Things like sharing passwords and unofficial 
personal back-door systems access credentials were often contemplated, engaged in, and 
implicitly excused in the name of the overarching requirements of getting work done in a 
fast-paced and demanding workplace. 
3.7.1 Tribal Security Control 
The notion of a “tribe” is illustrative of this implicit ISP workaround perspective 
we encountered. It was the shared norm of the workgroup culture that company security 
was critically important and would not knowingly be compromised, but that in certain 
cases minor violations of ISP requirements in service of workgroup productivity could be 
excused.  This “tribe” operated as a dedicated subgroup of the overall company, and their 
views of ISP compliance were highly contingent and contextual. 
3.7.2 Clan Cybersecurity Control 
The Cybersecurity Tribe operated as an embedded group in the overall 
bureaucracy of firm we were investigating, which we characterize with Ouchi’s (1980) 
“clan” rubric. The “clan” organizational form (which considers hierarchical downward 
delegation of responsibility for achieving corporate objectives as a key component) is 
seen to be highly useful when performance requirements are fluid. Managers in “clans” 
permit the delegation of certain policy decisions down the ladder of hierarchical 
responsibility for purposes of facilitating workgroup performance in dynamic 
environments. That seemed to be the case in this Tribal Security scenario.  In addition to 
our focus group, we also interviewed the chief security officer of the firm and were able 
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to view the phenomenon from the perspectives of both employees and managers. In our 
interaction with this manager, we had the clear impression that the rather “loose” 
normative views of the tribal workgroup were not unknown to higher managers, but that 
certain informal excuses could be made so long as work was done and corporate security 
was not compromised. It was a case of “knowing, but not knowing.” 
3.7.3 Auditors of Clans and Tribes 
The issue of most interest in this case is what the most productive role of IS 
auditors might be in such situations where informal workgroup policies operate in 
seeming contradiction to corporate ISP requirements. Auditors can take one of two key 
roles in their interaction with firms, as regards to cybersecurity compliance:  advisor or 
enforcer (Steinbart et al., 2013). Considering that workgroup workarounds in clans only 
arise from the necessity of getting work done, as long as workgroup members are well-
intentioned and are not causing overt security breaches that might harm the firm, it is our 
sense that consultative auditing is valuable. It has been noted that the auditor’s job is 
often in flux and is malleable, in the fast-changing technology-facilitated workplace 
(Abu-Musa, 2008; Pathak, 2005; Sharkasi, 2015). From our qualitative assessment, 
which included transcriptions of a conference panel presentation of Accounting IT 
experts on the notion of IT Audit and Cybersecurity (Islam et al., 2017), we learned 
that…  
…reviewing a management’s approach and plan for cybersecurity is the avenue 
most likely to be adopted by independent audit firms. So the question concerns the 
approach that firms can take to review and provide assurance to upper management and 
to other stakeholders that their cybersecurity efforts are appropriate. 
45 
Adaptability is advised, and the most valuable contribution auditors can make in 
such circumstances might be not to identify and sanction non-malicious violations of the 
ISP that are carried out for workplace expediency, but rather to audit the ISP, itself, to see 
how it may be modified and evolved to fit workplace contingences and security 
exigencies (Vroom & Solms, 2004).  
…since the accounting functions is depending upon the information system, there 
are a lot of policies pertaining to the information systems and their use. 
On matters of cybersecurity, then, the IT Auditor is likely the most valuable 
objective consultant and critic of the process that is designed to manage and enforce 
security compliance in the firm. The auditors who advised us in understanding this 
process indicate that the function of audit is to consult, to improve, to guide; it is the role 
of corporate management to seek and embrace auditing guidance in the matter of 
improving cybersecurity. Auditors are certainly capable of identifying problems that 
exist; they are also very valuable for purposes of designing ways to prevent problems 
from arising, when they identify managerial controls that could be improved and take 
notice of employee behaviors that could be more usefully directed. It is, however, the role 
of management to ensure that the standard against which audit is conducted, the 
Information Security Policy, is meaningful in the context of the work the company does, 
is responsive to the needs of the company for security, and is contextualized to the 




This is a study of non-malicious cybersecurity non-compliance in the firm, with 
implications for new and improved audit practices to counter it. Inasmuch as IS auditing 
is concerned with internal control systems aimed at securing the technology and 
information assets of the firm (Abu-Musa, 2008; Pathak, 2005), it makes sense to 
consider ways in which the evolving perspective of auditors could match the evolving 
uses for and implications of technology in the firm. The tendency of workplace 
technology users to become habitually reliant on technology implementations that are 
popularly considered to be “safe” (i.e., The Mac Factor) is one area of auditor evolution 
in IT knowledge that should be explored. Understanding the degree to which some users 
could become complacent with putatively safe computing platforms or supposedly 
excellent corporate IS Security implementation is an important step in the evolution of 
the auditor’s outlook in the increasingly “cyber-risky” information age.  
Moreover, in keeping with the notion of the consultative IS auditor (Steinbart et 
al., 2013), guidance for workers and advice to managers regarding amelioration of lax 
security behaviors brought by complacency factors is a useful contribution. User buy-in 
to security imperatives is to be essential for success (Bednar et al., 2013; Spears & Barki, 
2010) and identifying the users most promising for advising, training and motivating for 
cybersecurity buy-in is a valuable contribution that auditors can provide.   This 
consultative contribution can be matched with an ongoing evolutionary consideration of 
the ISP, itself, through periodic audits and updates. As with all risk management controls, 
the policies, themselves, are as subject to audit and revision as are the behaviors of the 
personnel subject to such policies (Sharkasi, 2015; Vroom & Solms, 2004). 
47 
3.8.1 Auditing Organizations in the Era of  
Technological Expediency  
The notion of Cybersecurity Loafing is distinctive from CyberComplacency. On 
the one hand, technology workers are making rational choices to circumvent policy in the 
name of workplace efficiency, whereas on the other hand users simply have misplaced 
trust in stereotypically “safe” technology implementations which leads them to laxity.    
The notion of “auditing the ISP” is particularly relevant in the former case; if 
workplace demands are such that users frequently are obliged to “wink and nod” to the 
requirements of the security policies in place, it may be the case that the security policies 
should be revised to accommodate the new types of workflows and their associated 
security necessities. After all, it is not exactly a crime to share a user account in a 
collaborative workgroup; sharing the access credentials to a commonly used system 
would only be considered a security violation if the ISP forbade it, yet if the policy is 
properly constructed as an instrument of secure workplace facilitation of technology use, 
it may be worth the revision to accommodate emerging practices dictated by workflows 
and business process. The auditor can play a critical consultative role in instantiating such 
discussions as part of the audit process. 
3.8.2 Practical Implications 
Auditors with wise discernment and implicit consultative guidance are essential to 
meeting the cybersecurity challenges of the increasingly volatile technology age. 
Sanctions will achieve far less value for the firm in the case of non-malicious insiders 
than will consultative assistances aimed toward developing more informed technology 
users. Furthermore, in a time when security is hard pressed to keep up with the evolution 
of the technology that it is intended to protect, it is the auditor, specifically, who has the 
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objective role of seeing both sides of the cybersecurity challenge: the subjective views of 
the company that desires to protect its assets and the equally subjective workers who 
desire to do their jobs with full efficiency. Reconciliation of these seemingly 
contradictory objectives can be found with consultative guidance, and this can become a 











IRON CAGE OR IRON SHIELD? A STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONAL 
INFORMATION SECURITY BUREAUCRACIES 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 Information systems security has become a growing priority for modern 
management, which has acknowledged that security failures can damage corporate 
reputations, deteriorate client trust, and diminish market value (Campbell et al., 2003; 
Gal-Or & Ghose, 2005; Gordon & Loeb, 2002). Information system security is a complex 
managerial challenge because it involves not only dimensions of technical sophistication, 
but also aspects of organizational behavior and employee motivation, managerial practice 
and philosophy (Crossler et al., 2013; Zafar & Clark, 2009). While extensive studies have 
evoked and enriched the understanding of organizational insiders arrayed against security 
interests (Posey et al., 2013; Warkentin & Willison, 2009; Willison & Warkentin, 2013), 
have supported learning about organizational activities in support of security (Bulgurcu et 
al., 2010; Herath & Rao, 2009a; Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010), and have informed 
organizational approaches to preserving security (D’Arcy et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2004; 
Straub, 1990), little weight has been given to understanding behavioral security through 
the lens of macro level organizational structures. The lack of such a macro organizational 
focus can engender inefficient theoretical reductionism, leasing to deterministic reasoning 
in pursuit of optimum security outcomes (Sadok et al., 2014).  
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In keeping with Johnson and Goetz’s (2007) conception of embedding 
information security in an organization, this research is intended to explore the interplay 
between organizational structures and security activities. The neglect of contingency 
factors such as organizational strategy, organizational structure and corporate culture is 
likely to lead to conflicts between IS implementations and organizational systems (Weill 
& Olson, 1989; Raymond, 1990). The IS implementation literature (Leifer,1988; Markus 
& Robey, 1983; 1988; Hong & Kim, 2002) suggests that the match between information 
systems and organizational structures determine the success of IS implementations, while 
the structuration literature (Hussain & Cornelius, 2009; Jones & Karsten, 2008; 
Orlikowski, 1992) indicates that technologies and technology users are inextricable 
interlinked. Hence, it can be argued that in order to safeguard information assets 
effectively, an organization cannot solely depend upon security professionals or specific 
organizational department in charge of security. Instead, we postulate that a higher level 
of security should be instilled into organizational routines, a process of information-
securing in which organizational efforts, resources, and knowledge can be pooled and 
leveraged to cope with threats and exploitation contingencies.   
4.1.1 A Case Study Approach:  
Security Bureaucracies 
In order to understand the structural deployment of IS security in the organization, 
a qualitative case study was conducted with two leading Fortune 500 IT corporations. 
The case study included in-depth interviews with top security executives of each 
company as well as focus group interviews with security workers. In the process of 
understanding the meaning of our interviews, a derivative of the Weberian bureaucratic 
model (cf. Weber, 1946; 1947) was leveraged to understand the information-securing 
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process. Distinguished from the constructs of bureaucracy as they have appeared in prior 
literature, the notion of bureaucracy in a security context (i.e., security bureaucracies) is 
used to describe how security is mingled into organizational structures by way of 
representing an organizational approach to accomplishing security goals.  
Briefly stated, security bureaucracy is comprised of mainly three dimensions. 
First, security-related responsibilities are narrowly divided into unambiguously defined 
realms and roles, i.e., a division of security labor.  Second, two categories of hierarchies 
of authority can be exhibited in the organization. Despite possible overlapping functions, 
one refers to managerial authorities where accountability for ensuring the compliance 
with security policies, standards, and practices, resides (pp. 128, Whitman & Mattord, 
2013). The other category of authority resides in implementational expertise and appears 
to be technical, expertise-focused, wherein resides the responsibility for implementation 
and maintenance of security technologies. The last dimension of security bureaucracy, 
standardization and formalization, represents the substantial written rules and procedures 
that govern day-to-day organizational security operations and activities; the corporate 
Information Security Policy (ISP) would be an example of such.   
To that end, a primary purpose of our research is to identify and describe the 
prerequisite properties and operational characteristics of security bureaucracies. 
4.1.2 Security Bureaucracies: Cage or Shield? 
In organizational studies, the classic bureaucratic form as envisioned by Weber 
(e.g., rule-based compartmentalization) has often been criticized due to its rigidity and 
implications for a regime of strict employee discipline. This view of organizational 
bureaucracy was characterized with the metaphor of the “iron cage” (Perrow, 1972). In 
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the iron cage, organizational life is compartmentalized and employee freedom is 
subverted by management’s rationalistic ideologies and standard behavioral controls 
(Hatch & Cunliffe, 2013). Alder and colleagues (1996, 2012) pointed out that unlike 
traditional, coercive bureaucratic forms based upon discipline, enabling forms of 
bureaucracy can center on expertise and experience. Enabling bureaucracy can thus be 
employed as an organizational approach to obtain expected outcomes through positive 
motivators as opposed to negative reinforcement implied by classic rule-based 
compartmentalization approaches (pp.1, Adler & Borys, 1996). We reason by way of 
illustration that the enablement of employees to gain security knowledge, skills and 
awareness will lead to superior organizational outcomes, thereby protecting information 
assets. Such an enabled bureaucracy would be better suited to the metaphor of an “iron 
shield” than an iron cage.   
As such, another important purpose of this article is to illuminate the dynamics 
and development of an enabled security bureaucracy in the workplace.  
The research purposes voiced here suggest a potential shift in the epistemological 
paradigm of security practices in the firm from prevailing micro perspectives to an 
emerging macro perspective. What we will characterize here as “information-securing” 
details how organizations are ensuring the security of their information assets based upon 
organizational bureaucratic forms in support of secure workplace behaviors.   To that 
end, two specific questions are addressed: (1) what is security bureaucracy and in what 
forms does it exist, and (2) how and why do security bureaucracies develop in support of 
the desirable state of information-securing? 
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 This article proceeds as follows: first, background literature is reviewed; then the 
methodology is explained. Following analysis of case data, an emergent theory of 
security bureaucracy is proposed, followed by discussion and implications for such 
secure bureaucratic forms in the firm. The paper concludes by noting limitations and 
potential avenues for future exploration. 
4.2 Background Literature: Bureaucratic Organizational Forms 
The sociologist Max Weber argued that the bureaucratic governance form 
comprised of compartmentalized responsibilities and rigid behavioral controls constituted 
the most efficient and formally rational way that human activities could be organized 
(Swedberg & Agevall, 2016). According to Weber’s formative work (1947), the 
bureaucratic structure is usually described through a dimensional approach, including:  
(1) division of labor based on functional specialization, (2) hierarchy of authority, (3) 
rules and procedures for controlling work situations, (4) impersonality of interpersonal 
relationships, and (4) promotion and selection based upon technical competence (Hall, 
1963). Among the foregoing qualities, formalization (comprised of written rules, 
procedures, and instructions) is the central component of organizational bureaucracy 
(Adler, 1996, Pugh & Hickson, 1976; Mintzberg, 1979).  
In an assessment of bureaucracy, Gouldner (1954) pointed out an organization can 
be “Janus-faced,” running in two ways, simultaneously: one way is administration based 
on discipline, whereas the other way is governance based on expertise. Specifically, 
Adler and Borys (1996) delineated bureaucracy as “a ceremonial mask” (a mock form), 
“a coercive weapon” (a punishment form), or “an enabling tool” (a representative form). 
In the form of the ceremonial mask, bureaucracy features abrogation of individual 
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autonomy and leads to the formation of employee alienation. The coercive function of 
bureaucracy can be attributed to power asymmetries within organizations (Adler & 
Borys, 1996). Since this type of formalization is built at the cost of the employee’s well-
being and it denigrates their motivation toward commitment and creativity. Unlike 
coercive bureaucracy, an enabling bureaucracy (though beneficial to employees) is often 
misunderstood. Both Gouldner (1954) and Adler (1993; 2012) envisioned that an 
organization can be a hybrid of enabling, ceremonial and even coercive forms of 
bureaucracy, but that to preserve organizational and employees’ well-being, enabling 
bureaucratic efforts should be magnified while coercive bureaucratic discomforts are 
attenuated. 
4.2.1 Bureaucracy in the Security Scenario   
According to Adler and Borys (1996), workflow formalization, specialization, and 
hierarchy are the core features of bureaucracy. Since organizational structures can 
profoundly influence the process of information-securing, it is essential to map 
bureaucratic features onto the information-securing concept for a better understanding of 
the interaction between organizational structure and organizational security. In order to 
establish context for this process, a brief review of behavioral security research is 
presented.  
In Straub and Welke’s (1998) seminal work, a firm’s Security Action Cycle is 
defined in four distinct phases: deterrence, prevention, detection, and recovery. In this 
view, organizations focus more on deterrence and prevention, where a myriad of risks 
can be effectively curtailed. Deterrence mechanisms such as security policies, security 
education training and awareness programs (SETA), along with security technology 
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implementations, have been regarded as indispensable countermeasures to protect 
information assets (D’Arcy et al., 2009; Dhillon, 1999; Straub & Welke, 1998; Whitman 
& Mattord, 2016).  General Deterrence Theory, widely cited in IS security research 
(Siponen et al., 2008; D’Arcy & Herath, 2011), posits that certain, swift, and severe 
punishment can prevent individuals from committing illicit acts against security policies. 
Deterrence theory typically revolves around theoretical constructs such as security policy 
compliance (e.g., Herath & Rao, 2009a; 2009b; Pahnila et al., 2007; Siponen et al., 2007) 
and IS misuse prevention (e.g., D’Arcy et al., 2009; Harrington, 1996; Siponen & Vance, 
2010).  
Three features of bureaucracy can be found in corresponding aspects of security 
research. The first feature is the specialization of security (analogous to division of 
labor), which is centered on the idea that IS security efforts should be divided up among 
qualified individuals in the workplace in order to undertake it more efficiently and 
economically. It can be assumed that various communities of interest sharing a common 
goal of securing information assets exist in organizations. In that respect, three groups of 
security communities can be categorized
3
: security managers, security technicians, and 
security implementers.  
Security managers are accountable for day-to-day operations of the security 
program and, in addition to monitoring and evaluative roles, frequently participate in 
designing and developing the security program. Their main responsibilities are 
managerial, administrative, and procedural.  By contrast, security technicians are skilled 
professionals who develop, implement, and maintain security technologies such as 
                                                 
3
 It occurs that a security administrator, or authority, functions as a hybrid of a security manager and a 
security technician (pp. 187, Whitman and Mattord 2013). The two hierarchies can be interchangeable, yet 
dividing authority into two groups here is to detail security hierarchies of authority in an organization.  
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firewalls, antivirus software, intrusion detection and prevention tools, and access 
controls. Security technicians shoulder the responsibilities of guiding and supporting the 
use of security technologies. The last group, security implementers, are the information 
systems end-users who are required to adhere to security policies, standards, and 
practices in their use of corporate technological resources. These individuals are typically 
characterized as “the weakest link of the security chain” and are most frequently 
considered as the vector for security insider threats due to their potential for direct 
misbehavior and/or malicious activities which could compromise systems security (cf. 
Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2009; Stanton et al., 2005; Warkentin & Willison, 2009). In 
contrast to the “weak link” rubric, some research has argued that these security 
technology end-users can be entrusted as defenders of information assets (cf. Hsu et al., 
2015; Posey et al., 2013, 2015; Stanton & Stam, 2006).  
The second bureaucratic feature that can be applied to the security context is 
formalization/standardization – analogous to the Information Security Policy (ISP) – 
comprised of a system of written rules and procedures for dealing with security activities. 
The underlying reason of formalization is to mitigate and reduce risks and harms caused 
by causal or informal security behaviors, such as omissive activities (Workman et al., 
2008) and nonmalicious security violations (Guo et al., 2011).  This aspect of security 
bureaucracy requires all employees to follow formalized security rules, regulations, and 
policies devised for governing organizational security activities. Undoubtedly, we have 
seen security policies have been the theme of behavioral research. The role of such 
instances of formalization/standardization is prevalent in behavioral security reach; for 
instance, studies of compliance with security policies (e.g., Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Herath 
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& Rao, 2009a; Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010) and quality of security policies (e.g.,  Hsu 
et al., 2015; Pahnila et al., 2007; Siponen & Vance, 2010) have flourished in the security 
literature. 
The last dimension of bureaucracy that can be applied to the security context is 
represented by the hierarchy of authority. Adler and his colleagues (Adler, 1999; 2012; 
Adler & Borys, 1996) argued that there are two dimensions of bureaucracy:  there is the 
coercive aspect (oriented to control and discipline) and the enabling aspect (oriented to 
valuing knowledge and expertise). In like manner, there could be two facets of security 
hierarchies, as well – one related to rules and discipline (the coercive bureaucratic 
dimension) and one oriented to skill and expertise (the enabling bureaucratic dimension).  
Rigidity and apathy, the main weaknesses of coercive bureaucracy, should be avoided in 
security scenarios; no good comes from disaffected employees operating under strict and 
rigid control.  If employees are required to strictly adhere to rules, particularly if the rules 
are considered to be outmoded and unreasonable, security implementations will face 
material resistance analogous to the resistance organizations face in general IS 
implementations that are poorly led (cf. Hirschheim & Newman, 1988; Markus, 1983; 
Lapointe & Rivard, 2005).  
There can be alienation, apathy, or other negative effects that arise from overly-
controlling relationships between security administers and implementers. For that reason, 
the first criterion in building a successful security bureaucracy is to determine which 
rules are “good” and which may be seen by employees as “bad.” In terms of control 
practices, rules which are rigid and uncompromising can seem “bad” to employees who 
see themselves as empowered and capable. Rules which permit employee buy-in and 
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extend trust and delegate responsibility can seem “good” to employees who wish to feel 
empowered and capable on security matters.  
Employees often experience stress due to work overload, task complexity, and 
workplace uncertainty. Such factors, when present in security requirements, can cause 
employee disengagement, thereby increasing their potential intentions to violate IS 
security policies (D’Arcy et al., 2014). Hence, a second criterion of evaluating security 
bureaucracy relates to “cold” versus “warm” rules:  Warm rules are caring rules, rules 
which take employee morale into consideration and are predicated upon employee 
engagement and motivation to achieve a secure workplace. Cold rules are aloof rules, 
disengaged from employee motivational factors and do not take employee buy-in into 
account. These can lead to apathetic security responses.  
In regards to conceptualizations of the bureaucratic organizational form, there is 
abundant research on formalization and standardization in the security literature, whereas 
work on security specialization and security management hierarchies is less prevalent. To 
that end, and in order to consider security bureaucracies properly, there is a deficiency in 
the literature in terms of elaborating the putative dimensions of such specialization and 
hierarchical security structures. These bureaucratic attributes in security contexts cannot 
be well-demonstrated or closely examined until a systematic examination is undertaken, 






4.3 Methodology  
The goal of this research is to explore how security management and procedures 
interact with organizational structures, with an eye toward understanding bureaucratic 
organizational structures in the governance of organizational security. For purposes of 
basis understanding of emergent phenomena, a case study design is appropriate (Yin, 
2009).  Mainstream information security research has tended to focus on variables as 
actors, activities, or approaches. The unit of analysis here revolves around organizational 
design and for security implementation. In other words, exploring the fit between security 
and organizational structure is the prime driver of this study.  
Without a priori hypotheses, the study started with an inductive approach focusing 
on security organization structures at two Fortune 500 IT corporations, referred to here as 
Sigma Services Corporation (for brevity, Sigma) and Mu Telecommunications, Inc. 
(Mu). The selection of these companies was guided by two principles proposed by 
Eisenhardt (1989):  similarity and variation. Situating in similar industry sectors 
(telecommunications and technology services), Sigma and Mu produce a homogeneous 
set of products and services. Yet, the two companies are distinguished by heterogeneous 
organizational characteristics, in terms of structure, culture, and security mechanisms.  
4.3.1 Data Collection  
In our effort to discern organizational security bureaucracies inductively, we 
initiated case interviews with a set of guiding questions, which we offered to our 




Manager introduction:  
Since you are responsible for managing employees under the information security 
policy of the organization, we are interested in your views on how security is organized. 
We are also interested in learning about the views your company has of security and 
security policies, and how that might be used in organizational governance? 
Employee introduction:  
 
We came to interview you about your perceptions of information security tasks 
and requirements as part of your job at (Sigma, Mu). We would also like to talk about 
how you interact with your fellow employees in regard to security practices and policies 
on the job.    
These general questions led to reflection on and discussion about their security 
activities in the company.  Responses were recorded with a digital field recorder for 
subsequent transcription and analysis.  
We began our inquiries with focus groups with groups of employees who had job 
descriptions typically characterized as project lead, software developer, or programmer, 
from each of the target corporations. We then sought meetings for purposes of conducting 
in-depth interviews with senior security managers and Chief Information Security 
Officers (CISOs).
4
  This approach permitted us to contrast the views of managers with 
those of the employees for purposes of developing a clear view of the organizational 
structure and hierarchy surrounding security operations at each of the firms.  
                                                 
4
 It is easy to blur the distinction between security manager and CISO in some circumstances because the 
CISO is often an overarching role, primarily accountable for developing and implementing organizational 
security programs. The CISO usually works along with or reports to other top executives such as the 
corporate Chief Information Officer. A security manager refers to a mid-level specialist responsible for 
daily security operations that are defined by the CISO. In our case, we interviewed one CISO (at Mu) and 
one Security Manager (at Sigma). 
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The first firm, Sigma, is a large corporation with annual revenue exceeding five 
billion dollars and about 20,000 employees at various offices, nationwide.  Its target 
markets include but are not limited to civil government, national security, health care and 
public health. The second firm, Mu, is an international leader in integrated 
telecommunications services, providing a full range of communications services to both 
residential and business clients, including telephony, IP broadband, secure and managed 
networks, information technology consulting, and other ancillary areas. Mu employs 
approximately 40,000 workers and reports more than seventeen billion dollars of 
revenue, annually. The employees we interacted with at each company had extensive 
experience with security activities, not only at their corporate level of employment, but 
also with respect to client firms that their employers served.  
Focus group meetings last about 90 minutes, one per company, while the in-depth 
interviews with the managers took about one hour. Each set of encounters was recorded 
on a digital field recorder for later transcription and analysis with qualitative data analysis 
software (in this case, QSR’s NVivo 10).  Before proceeding, interviewees were briefed 
on human subjects committee details, including informed consent, intended uses of data, 
confidentiality, etc.  
We specifically emphasized anonymity and confidentiality of responses, in order 
to motivate them to express their views freely and without reservation (cf. Kirk & Miller, 
1986, Yin, 2009). In addition to audio recordings of our interviews, and our specific 
observations of respondent behaviors during the meetings,  other sources of evidence 
were sought, including documentation (e.g. corporate security guidelines, code of ethics) 
and physical artifacts (e.g. cubicles, signs, security monitors). As Yin (pp.101, 2009) 
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articulated, a well-designed case study will use as many data sources as possible since 
each source is complementary of another. Furthermore, using multiple sources of data 
can increase the validity of the findings. 
4.4 Analysis and Results 
After transcribing the interviews into electronic text files, a computer-assisted 
qualitative data analysis software package (QSR NVivo 11) was used to store, organize, 
and analyze our interview responses. The interview data was analyzed by continuous 
segmentation and classification in accordance with emergent categories representing 
concepts, themes, or issues of interests (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Following Yin's (2011) 
five-phase data analysis, we performed compiling, disassembling, reassembling, 
interpreting, and concluding data in a recursive manner. Our initial interpretations had to 
do with the nature of the firm as a securing system for information. 
4.4.1 The Organization as an Information-Securing System  
Developing the concept of an information-securing system is the direction our 
inductive analysis took us as we considered the nature of security bureaucracies from the 
perspective of the duality represented by workers and their managers.  Our initial 
consideration was that companies are frequently characterized by their predominant 
functional features.  For example, Amazon.com can be called a marketing company 
because it excels in marketing its products to consumers through its web presence and 
customer relationship management systems. If the defining function of a company is 
considered pivotal, then it can be embedded in many aspects of the company. 
Amazon.com employees are all consumer-centric, as that is the mission of their firm. By 
contrast, the employees in our encounters with Sigma and Mu were security-centric, since 
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the business of their respective employers was to provide secure networking resources or 
to engage in security consulting with its customers. Sigma and Mu are security 
companies, and their business practice can be considered one of “information securing.” 
To that end, an organization can be considered an information-securing 
organization if it is highly concerned about safeguarding its information assets, across the 
board, and organizes itself accordingly. As previously discussed, we consider 
organizational structures for security practices as forms of bureaucracy, which we 
characterize as security bureaucracies. In keeping with modern conceptualizations of 
bureaucratic organizational forms as being multidimensional (Adler 1999; 2012; Adler & 
Borys, 1996) we observe at least two bureaucracy archetypes in our data and analysis:  
the more traditional coercive bureaucratic aspect and the emergent enabling aspect 
(oriented to valuing knowledge and expertise).  
Among these, along with the broad and general enabling form, which orients to 
training and enculturation, we discern two specific variations of the coercive form – one 
based in the formality of developing procedurally mandated guidelines and requirements 
which could be subsequently enforced, and the other specifically focused on procedural 
coercion, benchmarked in monitoring of compliance with previously developed standards 
developed in earlier bureaucratic stages.  Consequently, we classify security bureaucracy 
into three archetypes to the extent that Adler’s two bureaucratic functions (discipline and 
expertise). As noted in Table 1, we characterize these as either 1) Security Prototype or 2) 
Security Structure; these two are at the coercive end of the bureaucratic spectrum, at 
varying levels – with Security Prototype having low deployed coercion, but involving the 
development of the standards and guidelines to be used for coercive bureaucratic 
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enforcement in later evolutions, whereas Security Structure revolves around coercive 
enforcement of the developed standards and guidelines from the prior. The third 
bureaucratic archetype is Security Superstructure (emblematic of the enabling 
bureaucratic form); this archetype favors knowledge sharing and employee enablement 
for culturally-mediated dedication to security standards, as opposed to the development 
of standards or the coercive enforcement of standards as in the prior stages.  
Each form is conceptualized as arising from context-specific prerequisites of 
organizational capabilities, of embodying specific properties and as being evidenced by 
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The first coercive bureaucratic archetype, the Security Prototype, refers to a 
preliminary model of security bureaucracy from which security structures can be derived 
(and subsequently enforced in later stages). We consider this a coercive stage, as 
compared to the polar opposite of enablement, as it focuses on the development of rules 
for subsequent enforcement, even though specific enforcement efforts are, in fact, low 
during developmental phases.  
Security Prototype is formulated by a group of experts who possess adequate 
technical or procedural knowledge and skills for applying the best practices of 
information security. It manifests itself, per specific “proofs,” in security rules and 
regulations enacted by governmental agencies or accreditation authorities (such as the 
Federal Information Security Management Act, called FISMA, accreditation 
requirements for authority to operate, or ATO, and the authority to connect, or ATC). 
These structuring elements can be inculcated into corporate security frameworks and 
standardizations.  
Although its structural objective is control (i.e., coercive), the Security Prototype 
is mainly established upon topic area expertise and does not seek specific enforcement; it 
is confined to the expert designers’ bounded rationality and knowledge. Security 
practices based on this archetype are, largely, inherently static collections of directives, 
since the experts developing the security policies and procedures are the only participants 
in the security action cycle. As a security executive once remarked (Whitman & Mattord, 
pp. 132, 2016), “Security policies are collected as bound documents that sit imposingly 
on the shelf gathering dust - never making an impact on what actually happens in the day-
to-day operations of organization.” The Security Prototype, in establishing collections of 
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rules and directives, can be considered part of the overall coercive approach inasmuch as 
rules are one half of coercive bureaucracy. However, rules in absence of enforcement do 
not go far in promoting the process of information-securing in organizations.  
In regards to the second archetype characterized in the coercive bureaucratic 
form, Security Structure encompasses all aspects of the traditional definition of 
bureaucracy - formalization of security activities, specialization of security roles and 
responsibilities, and hierarchy of authority. Going beyond the rule-making tendency of 
the Security Prototype, which is the earliest and nascent phase of the coercive 
bureaucratic form, Security Structure operates in a systematic fashion to see rules 
previously applied to be presently enforced, and is fully coercive. The goal of the 
Security Structure archetype is to enforce and ensure IS security compliance, such that 
documented rules and policies are transformed into routines. As such, monitoring and 
supervision systems (i.e., SETA programs) are implemented to ensure that employees 
follow security protocols. Compared with the precursor Security Prototype, Security 
Structure offers dynamic and explicit controls arising from rules and guidelines for secure 
operation, leading to a hierarchy of security authorities such as security administrators 
and technicians. End-users are also involved, but passively participating in the security 
chain as controlees. In regards to the division of security labor, it is clear to say that 
security management is in charge of the security design; whereas end-users are obliged to 
comply with IS security policies. 
The final archetype of security bureaucracy, Security Superstructure, is not at all 
coercive. It is an enabling form that advances beyond the capabilities of the Security 
Structure archetype.  The term “superstructure” originates in Marxist historical 
68 
materialism and was articulated in the Preface to the Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy (originally 1859), the Grundrisse (1857) and also in Capital (1867). 
Society is modeled as a source of production, made up of means of production and 
relations of production; the “superstructure,” which encompasses culture, religion, and 
law is used to moderate internal conflicts within organizations (Adler, 2012). In our 
usage, superstructure is largely cultural, being defined as a posture of organizational 
security built upon shared security values, beliefs, and a problem-solving philosophy. The 
culture of security is an increasingly important recent area of research focus (Da Veiga & 
Eloff, 2010; Ruighaver et al., 2007; Van Niekerk & Von Solms, 2010; Von Solms, 2000). 
The underlying mechanism is the enculturation of security, thereby enabling 
employees across the organization to perceive the security responsibilities of corporate 
citizens. While superstructure is expected to be the optimal state of organizational 
security, it is rooted in its archetypical coercive antecedent, Security Structure, which 
specifies physical security mechanisms and practices. 
4.4.2 The Archetypes of Information Securing 
Three archetypical organizational forms of security bureaucracy have been 
posited: Security Prototype, Security Structure, and Security Superstructure. In summary, 
Security Prototype is developed from industrial standards, best practices, or from 
organizational authorities, and refers to the foundational yet static documentation of 
security operations and activities; its aim is the codification of that for which compliance 
will be sought, which is why we characterize it as coercive, even though very little 
enforcement take place at this archetype stage. In regards to Security Structure, the 
enforcing of rules and the ensuring of policy compliance is sought utilizing a variety of 
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administrative and monitoring technologies, and it is fully coercive in its aim of 
compliance with standards. Lastly, Security Superstructure revolves around enculturation 
that encompasses shared security values and symbolically-legitimated ideas and problem-
solving philosophies shared among coworkers. Information securing companies, 
operating under the enabling Security Superstructure archetype, would embrace strategy, 
structure, and culture supportive of information security as a business practice. Coercion 
is eschewed at this archetypical stage. 
4.5 Archetypical Characterizations in our Data:  
Interpretive Demonstrations 
 
In our case study, emblematic of the representation of a firm devoted to 
information securing, employees discussed the differences between marketing and 
manufacturing companies and security companies.  As specifically voiced by one of the 
employees: 
[Widget manufacturing company] employees care about their products but they 
don’t necessarily have security as their number one focus. Security is not what they do all 
day, and at a company like ours [security] is our key focus. If I fail [on a matter of 
security], not only will my entire group fail, but also the company, possibly a number of 
careers. (Employee C, Sigma Corporation) 
As an organization perceives security incentives from environmental 
contingencies, it has to take actions to design and develop its own security mechanisms. 
The security demands can come from clients who are taking delivery of security-
embedded products and services, or from authorities setting industry rules and policies, 
such as governments or credentialing agents. This point emphasizes that organizational 
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strategy, structure, and culture can impact security implementation and its effectiveness 
in the firm. As a security manager emphasized, the requirement for security can come 
from external guidance as well as from client needs: 
[Federal government agencies] provide us with security frameworks, they govern 
how we provide client support, how I manage my teams, how I build the teams, how I 
train teams,… the processes that we build daily to support [the agency’s] infrastructure, 
that’s all based upon these guidelines. And, with FISMA [the Federal Information 
Security Management Act] that just depends upon the level of controls that are actually 
in place … it can be federally mandated… so all these controls that we build what we do 
operationally from that [agency-provided] control set (Security Manager, Sigma). 
If you don’t complete the mandatory required training [for FISMA compliance], 
you lose your clients that you’ve been given to support for that particular program or 
customer. So, really, it is in your best interest to complete the training if you want to 
continue your career. (Security Manager, Sigma) 
Based on our previous archetype definitions and explanation, the bureaucratic 
archetype Security Structure is about enacting security rules, procedures, and standards 
into practice. This would be analogous to the formalization aspect of classic bureaucracy. 
In particular, in this case it is about enforcing end-user compliance with the Information 
Security Policy of a client (a government agency, in this particular case). Accordingly, 
the control aspects of this model have been fortified since we have found specific 
evidence indicating stronger standardization and formalization, owing to governmental 
oversight.  The particularly strict security structure of this circumstance can been 
described as follows: 
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[It’s a] more secured environment where you have to document every single thing 
you do as it gets approved by an excess number of people, and then once you make a 
change you have to validate it and write the whole “post of change review” to confirm 
that all your security is still in place. (Employee A, Sigma) 
… if you can scale that back, you can think about the organization in an entire 
process when it comes to policy, their procedures, documentation, how well the work 
process is understood, what needs to be done. There is [are] actual documents, methods 
for doing these things when you streamline this process, then the frequency that is 
something is inconvenient is reduced. (Employee C, Sigma) 
Such instances coincide with the classic Weberian models of bureaucracy, 
embodying, as they do, coercive and formalized perspectives of organizational structure. 
In the rubric developed in our review, this would relate to the metaphor we developed 
earlier of “cold” rules, and the Iron Cage characterization. Of course, such strictures are 
essential, the information securing being carried out by a firm, in this case, having its 
primary business in government contracts and often-times classified matters of national 
security, owing to the work being done.  
Information about hierarchical organizational forms in the organization’s security 
activities was also discerned.  The “military” metaphor arose in the course of the Sigma 
Corporation security manager’s interview, emblematic of the meaning of hierarchical 
controls in dominating employees’ security-related attitudes and activities in that 
workforce:  
Here is my opinion about the nature of the hierarchy: I am not paying you to think 
but paying you to do… it’s the higher [mission] and getting everybody to understand that 
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this is in the best interests for all of us to do it this way is important (Security Manager, 
Sigma). 
Security Superstructure, the ideal archetype of security bureaucracy, has also been 
emphasized in the security manager’s descriptions of collaborative climate and culture: 
I want you to be able to ask any questions from anybody; have anybody ask 
questions from you, too.  That type of client work is more like a family; we try to build a 
family-like atmosphere, within the restrictions of the government boundaries (Security 
Manager, Sigma). 
At Sigma Corporation, which operates a number of military contracts, in order to 
establish and acculturate employees who will share a common set of security values, 
beliefs, and problem-solving philosophies, the company’s recruiting strategies orient 
around a bureaucratic form frequently found in military organizations: 
Part of the way we recruit [at Sigma] is to find candidates who know where we 
are from, so we often recruit from military bases. They already understand the culture 
under which we operate, what is needed to be done, and why (Security Manager, Sigma). 
Among the three security bureaucracy archetypes, there are inter-relationships; 
the highly coercive Security Structure, which is largely concerned with Information 
Security Policy development and enforcement, arises in evolutionary fashion from the 
basic Security Prototype archetype (which largely seeks to simply develop the 
Information Security Policy of the firm, and has coercive aims if not effects). The most 
advanced security bureaucracy archetype, Security Superstructure (which embraces 
employee enablement and security enculturation) arises from evolutionary growth 
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beyond the basis enforcement function of the Security Structure archetype, and is not at 
all coercive.  
The archetypes may well conceptually overlap in phases of evolutionary transition 
from one to the next, as companies develop and perfect their approach to information 
securing by evolving from more basic and structured coercive forms to more enabled 
consultative modes of security culture in the firm.   However, we specifically assert that 
security bureaucracies are not static, and do evolve with experience, development and 
managerial insights on the part of the participants.  
This argument, as visually demonstrated in Figure 4.1, is based on the notion that 
the three types of security bureaucracy archetypes will not remain static in the face of 
environmental contingencies. In addition to the possible causal relationships related to 
motivation, compliance, and normative pressures between the three archetypes, it is 
worthwhile to note that the change in control and expertise are inevitable when security 
bureaucracy structures evolve. Since control and expertise can be changed in both 
magnitude and direction, the term “vector” is used to illustrate the dynamics of the 
evolutionary process, to wit, control vectors and expertise vectors.  
As shown in the Figure 4.1, the Security Prototype archetype is the lowest on the 
experience vector, and low as well on the control vector, as sheer production of security 
policy documentation is the primary task engaged in. Evolution to the Security Structure 
archetype is accompanied by a growth in the experience vector and the highest level of 
strength in the control vector, as this archetype seeks to implement and monitor 
compliance with the security protocols that arose in the Security Prototype stage. In like 
manner, the Security Superstructure archetype embodies the greatest degree of expertise 
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and one of the lowest levels of the control vector, seeing that the enculturation of the 
workforce is expected to obtain the security enablement that might have been developed 
(Security Prototype archetype) and enforced (Security Structure archetype) in prior 





































Figure 4.1: The Model of Information-Securing. 
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4.5.1 Fueling the Structural Change:  
Training A, B, and C  
In our model of Information Securing, shown in the Figure, the factor that 
facilitates evolutionary growth between the security bureaucracy stages represented by 
the security archetypes we have been discussing is employee security training (shown in 
the model as TA,C and TB,C) .    We conceptualize three types of security training to 
facilitate bureaucratic evolution in recognition of the important role of training (what is 
commonly known as “SETA” programs in the literature) in information security (e.g., 
D’Arcy et al. 2009; Karjalainen & Siponen 2011; Puhakainen & Siponen 2010).  The 
three types of training widely discussed in the security literature are knowledge-oriented, 
culture-oriented, and continued training. We characterize these in the model as Training 
A (knowledge), B (culture), and C (continuity), respectively, for brevity in discourse. 
Training A (knowledge acquisition) is used to educate employees on security policies, 
behaviors or skills, and involves topics covering security reminders, protection from 
malicious software, password management, etc. Training A bridges static security 
countermeasures enacted by experts to dynamic ones implemented by end-users, 
essentially.  As the security manager in our field study outlined when we asked about 
how to ensure compliance with security policies that the organization committed to: 
It’s mandatory. There is an annual training. There goes on security awareness 
training, ethics, behaviors, dealing with authenticity. For each agency, for each 
customer, there are sets of compliance requirements. A little identical training 
information, but you need to do the test, take that training, understand the training, and 
being accredited each year, but it is all mandatory. (Security Manager, Sigma) 
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In addition to Training A (knowledge) and Training B (culture), which span the 
continuum of bureaucratic evolution shown in our mode, the importance of continuous 
training is also underscored.  The employees in Sigma stated that: 
That is where the continuous training comes in. So, every year, every six-month, 
every quarter, the company has different kinds of training, and once you go through that 
training, you will also be provided with documents for what was learned. So, there is 
training for the company, for projects, [and] teams. There is a lot of redundant training, 
but it is necessary (Employee A, Sigma). 
To that end, in our model, training represents the catalyst for evolution between 
the archetypical bureaucratic stages, with knowledge-based content and a continual focus 
on training delivery (TA,C)  forming the evolutionary bridge between Security Prototype 
and Security Structure. In like manner, a continual dedication to security enculturation in 
training (TB, C) forms the bridge between Security Structure and Security Superstructure. 
The transition from a focus on knowledge-based training in the early bureaucratic stages 
to enculturation in the latter stages is evidenced by the expansion of the expertise vector 
in the model, whereas the increasing dedication to security enculturation in the latter 
stages is emblematic of the reduction of the control vector in the Security Superstructure 
stage.  
4.5.2 Bureaucratic Evolution from Iron Cage  
to Iron Shield: Information Securing   
The Iron Cage, Max Weber’s most renowned metaphor, refers to a tyrannical 
organizational structure in which individuals are forced to work hard and methodically 
(Swedberg & Agevall, 2016). In a sense, Weber himself recognized its potential for 
trouble, warning that overreliance on bureaucratic formalities can hurt the people who 
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work within structures (Hatch & Cunliffe, 2013).  Critics often attack bureaucracy 
because it is maladjusted, from a motivational standpoint, and because it is considered to 
stifle the humanity of the workforce (pp. 5, Perrow, 1972).  
We are mindful of the harms of control and compliance-based bureaucratic forms, 
and argue that reliance upon security bureaucracy that encompass too much of the 
dehumanizing elements of structure and control can lead to similar problems, which is 
why we espouse an evolutionary process in our bureaucratic model of Information 
Securing.  Comprised of high degrees of control and compliance, the intermediary 
evolutionary stage, Security Structure, is likely insupportable as a long term option, and 
best serves as an evolutionary step toward the Security Superstructure that arises from 
decreasing control and increasing enculturation. Whereas Security Structure has all the 
un-redeeming qualities of Weber’s Iron Cage, we think of the more humanistic, 
culturally-based and more organizationally enlightened Security Superstructure archetype 
as an Iron Shield, to shift the metaphor. What is an intolerable burden, in the long run, at 
the mid-levels of bureaucratic development, through evolution to a more enabled 
organizational structure becomes an impregnable defense.  
Our understanding of Sigma Corporation, deeply involved with federal 
contracting and military clients, was that the Security Structure archetype was most 
descriptive of their practices, as we understood them. Their managers postulated federal 
and/or military guidelines for best practices, rarely mentioning procedures for validating 
the policies and rules. IT was a matter of “rules and regulations” in the absence of 
cultural understanding and full employee buy-in, perhaps. This would partly explain the 
attitude that certain employees had to the inevitable occurrence of informal security 
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workarounds that took place in the workplace from time to time, when unexpected 
challenges occurred, forcing standard operations off track. That the employees sometimes 
felt the necessity of stepping outside the boundaries of normal procedure might mean that 
the existing rule or policies were not as valid as expected, prompting workers to seek 
alternative ways of tackling security. These workarounds were typically workgroup 
specific, we noted:   
So, being in those situations as a part of the group having to deal with something, 
workarounds just happen. I think the point is that when you implement a workaround, it 
is something where you literally work “around the security,” doing something you know 
the policy says you should not do, or you are implementing something on the fly. We have 
the lessons learned all the time, things will always happen… it’s the nature of the game, 
we often do these things, and then we write it up later (Employee C, Sigma). 
Meanwhile, we found a concern for apathy.  Due to over-rigid security policies, 
colleagues may not be willing to support each other as well as security managers 
expected in less evolved bureaucratic stages.  There is a dilemma between collaboration 
and separation of duty, it seems. For example, the employees we talked to at Sigma 
agreed that if there was a team member who did not know certain things, they would not 
overdo a workaround to ameliorate the situation, since things like sharing a login or a 
credential fix since it violates important client certification guidelines. The bureaucratic 
atmosphere, at less evolved stages of information securing, can lead to employee tenure 
and turnover problems. The security manager pointed out that: 
I want [new employees] to get a taste for each new [work position]. I help move 
their career to that direction. The simple goal, in year 1 or year 2, is that I want them to 
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move on from here, get promoted there, and find something they really want to do in their 
career. [In that process] I know I'm going to lose probably 20-30% of those [new 
employees]. (Security Manager, Sigma) 
Weber’s Iron Cage, indicative of the adverse aspects of bureaucracy, undoubtedly 
causes problems for employees in the organization, and through its adverse effects, will 
cause problems for the organization in the long run if not evolved to more empowered 
forms supportive of information securing. Yet, archetypes emblematic of the Iron Shield 
(empowered, acculturated security practices) are more supportive of employee 
satisfaction and tenure. Tracing the historical origins of theoretical development of the 
bureaucracy concept, the meaning of bureaucracy at its formation, we should recognize 
that bureaucracy organizational forms can be used to help people cope with the work 
environment by providing the stability and structure that comforts workers.  
According to Adler (2012), the rational-system accounts of bureaucratic 
efficiency bear closer scrutiny, particularly in the way that they provoke positive 
responses from employees. As such, Adler indicates that (1) formalization and 
standardization are key means of sharing knowledge, (2) the authority hierarchy is used 
to orchestrate knowledge, (3) specialization is a means of deepening knowledge, and (4) 
staff functions should focus on distilling and infusing knowledge. Per our Information 
Securing Model, TA,C and TB,C have their place in the development of bureaucratic 
security forms to meet the combined needs of firms and their employees, it seems.  
In essence, security bureaucracy, properly practiced, should be considered as an 
organizational weapon against external threats (Iron Shield) rather than a cage to 
imprison employees, within. In order to configure such effective bureaucracies of 
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security, the first step is to mitigate the side effect of organizational rigidity (to wit, the 
control vector in our Information Securing Model). Compliance with security protocols is 
paramount and convincing protocols are more so. When we asked a security manager 
about how to ensure compliance, what is involved in making sure compliance takes 
place, he concluded:  
We have tried to have as many hard controls as possible to validate compliance; 
there are a number metrics that have [been] developed. For example, on my team I have 
a policy management, but I also have a responsibility for compliance in audit. One part 
of [my] team is mandating policy; the other part is going out assessing audits, making 
sure that, okay, this is actually what we are supposed to be doing. (Security Manager, 
Mu) 
It is sometimes necessary to soften internal tensions in security bureaucracies 
through employee enlightenment and enculturation. To that end, one has to first recruit 
people who have a similar culture or are willing to work to acculturate to the values of 
the bureaucratic organization.  To build better security bureaucracy, it is also important to 
promote corporate citizenship in accomplishing security tasks, as establishing a “point of 
belonging.” This has been demonstrated in the security manager’s hiring process and his 
corporate code of ethics. 
One interesting thing is going on in those days is how the federal government can 
command the infrastructure. Almost all companies spend money to accomplish what [the 
client] needs, but if there is no money around to accomplish that,   culture shift makes up 
the difference… you need to implement that. [In our business] it’s the national security 
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culture, and you need to volunteer to comply and [be seen to be] happy to comply, [in] 
mandating that culture [among the employees] in some way (Security Manager, Sigma). 
This mandate to a higher order, culture-wise, can be problematic, as it tends to 
displace the corporate culture with a culture of values seemingly from “from outside.” 
Notwithstanding that a security contractor with government ties must, of necessity, 
accede to the higher cultural level, this can come at a cost to internal norms and mores, 
perhaps. After talking about the turnover of new employees who could not get used to 
this company’s unusual cultural environment, the manager noted:  
I'm OK with that, doing the right thing in teaching them the right ways. Vice- 
versa, it's going work the same way, anywhere else, more or less. We are competitive 
here, creating the type of workforce that can be very flexible and can transition [through 
these issues] (Security Manager, Sigma). 
4.6 Toward an Emergent Theory of Security Bureaucracy  
Gregor (2006) classified the primary goals of theory for IS research as 1) analysis 
and description, 2) explanation, 3) prediction, and 4) prescription. Our theoretical 
construction begins with analyzing and describing the phenomenon of the interplay of 
organizational structure and information security, and proceeds by classifying three 
archetypes of information security bureaucracy based upon organizational prerequisites 
and governance properties. In view of our field research and analysis of the data, we 
consider that the main theorizing contribution provided by this article is Gregor’s second 
point, explaining. Adopting a macro-organizational perspective, we propose the concept 
of the information-securing organization to explain how and why security bureaucracies 
in the firm can develop from the initial archetype of Security Prototype to evolve through 
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a more organized and formalized construction, the Security Structure archetype, into 
what we consider the optimal bureaucratic organizational form for information security 
management and deployment: the Security Superstructure archetype.  
The development and dynamics of a security bureaucracy are based upon the 
assumption that an information-securing system has experienced and is acting to counter 
security-related threats and challenges, and that the evolving organizational form 
overseeing security operations seeks to bolster its capabilities to adapt to these 
occurrences. As a result, the organization can succeed in accordance with its provision of 
effective security-oriented deployments and services. In order to drive changes in 
organizational beliefs and attitudes toward information-securing, the paper is also 
intended to contribute theoretically in Gregor’s fourth area, prescription, with findings 
that guide insights on how to build a better organizational bureaucracy in the security 
context. The previous section of the paper has completed our description goal. In the 
concluding section, below, we focus mainly on explaining and predicting the theoretical 
model of information-securing based upon organizational information security 
bureaucracy archetypes.  
4.7 Discussion 
This article investigates how information security is enacted within organizations, 
interplaying with organizational structure, with particular attention to bureaucratic forms. 
As a result of our investigation and analysis, an intriguing and important theoretical 
construct - security bureaucracy - is developed as a contribution to the behavioral 
information systems security literature. In order to investigate the nature of security 
bureaucracies, we have conducted case study research with two prominent Fortune 500 
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corporations. The primary findings of this study array are in two general areas: (1) the 
properties and propensities of security bureaucracy organizational forms, and (2) the 
ways in which the security bureaucracy archetypes we describe can be leveraged to help 
organizations adapt to an ever-shifting security landscape.  
4.7.1 Exploring Properties and Propensities 
of Security Bureaucracies 
The first phenomenon of interest resonates with Johnson and Goetz's (2007) 
argument for “infused versus bolted-on” security in organizations. The evidence we 
present here in the present demonstrates that there are different types of development 
phases for organizational security implementations, as embodied in our proffered security 
bureaucracy archetypes - viz., Security Prototype, Security Structure, and Security 
Superstructure. Each archetypical organizational model possesses its own precursors that 
are based upon security incentives and imperatives that organization experience, related 
to the sorts of security-embedded implementations and support services they intend to 
produce.   
Briefly summarized, the Security Prototype archetype is a more static, 
technically-oriented, and structurally functional form of bureaucracy; Security Structure 
is an orthodox, well-established, yet highly coercive form of bureaucracy; and, Security 
Superstructure which finds its evolutionary origins in structure but goes beyond 
organizational structure precepts to enable security workers through acculturative 
mechanisms of symbols, terminology, languages, and artifacts. This most effective and 
evolved archetype is more about learning, which is the enabling mechanism of 
information-securing.  
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A highly effective way to distinguish one archetype from another in broader 
organizational settings is based upon the participants who construct the bureaucracy. In 
Security Prototype, the focal personnel are company experts who are in charge of security 
development. End-users are involved in Security Structure as controlees, in their role as 
the main implementers of security policies, procedures, and standards. In the Security 
Superstructure form, end-users rather than implementers, are encouraged and functionally 
enabled to understand, execute and oversee organizational security.   
4.7.2 A Critical Perspective on Security  
Bureaucracy: Evolution and Change  
As we see patterns and phases of security bureaucracies in practice, and as we 
analyze obstacles and opportunities that various archetypical security bureaucracies can 
bring to organizations (specifically, the bureaucratic juxtaposition of the Iron Cage versus 
the Iron Shield), we argue that evolution toward the Superstructure form is most effective 
for optimal security outcomes, over time. In order to understand how to expedite the 
process of information-securing, in the evolutionary growth of organizational security 
precepts through the sequence of bureaucratic archetypes, from Security Prototype to 
Security Structure and finally to Security Superstructure, the ultimate goal is to build an 
expertise-oriented, dynamic, and learning organizational model of information security. 
During this process, security training is a catalyst to enhance evolving security 
bureaucracies in terms of depth and breadth (cf. Hu et al., 2012; Orlikowski & Gash, 
1994). A continuity of training as well as the proper sequencing of the type of training 
appropriate for each bureaucratic phase (T A, C versus TB, C) is also very important in 
order to properly support and validate the security controls appropriate to a particular 
archetype in operation in a given period of time. 
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4.7.3 Contributions to Behavioral Security Research  
The theoretical arguments we advance here contribute to the behavioral 
information security literature in two aspects. First, a holistic view of organizational 
security models is provided to illustrate how organizational structure influences the 
implementation of security, and how security contingencies impact organizations as they 
seek to restructure to adapt to them. In order to better explain the phenomenon of interest, 
organizational structure theories are adapted to an information security context, i.e. 
security bureaucracy. In accordance with Adler’s  landmark work (1993, 1996, 2012), we 
outline the two primary underlying dimensions of security bureaucracies, coercion and 
enablement, and develop a theoretical model that describes how it is meaningful to 
maneuver an evolution organizational forms founded in the pessimism of coercion to the 
culturally-mediated optimism of enablement. The three archetypes of security 
bureaucracy that we explore and describe are offered to illuminate the necessary 
evolutionary process of organizational forms considered most effective for information 
securing.    
From an organizational perspective, this understanding underpins an essential 
component of behavioral security: individual behaviors which are deployed and 
organized in order to protect information assets (Crossler et al., 2013; Fagnot, 2008; 
Stanton et al., 2006). The implicit security mechanism underlying this bureaucratic 
evolution process is termed “information-securing” and it describes how organizations 
can deploy their efforts in order to adapt to environmental and situational contingencies, 
thereby obtaining and retaining the fit with the dynamic threat landscape against which 
security is deployed to counteract.  
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4.8 Conclusion and Future Research 
There are several limitations to consider. First, although we have conducted case 
studies with two Fortune 500 companies, involving both key information in-depth and 
larger group focus-group interviews, the findings on the interplay between IS security 
and organizational structure cannot be generalized to other organizations. As Yin (2009, 
2011) has aptly concluded, qualitative research can only generalize a theoretical context, 
and not to larger environmental contexts beyond that of the study, itself. As such, our 
contribution lies in the development and explication of theoretical constructs from our 
case study data. These theories will require quantitative testing for further generality in 
future research.  
As a second limitation, although we conceptualize three bureaucratic archetypes 
for information securing in the firm, there could be some overlapping issues regarding 
our categories. For example, Security Prototype could be considered to be embedded in 
the Security Structure archetype if security rules and policies are created to for immediate 
implementation. Likewise, there is a strong dependency of the functions of the Security 
Superstructure archetype on the practices and procedures of Security Structure. Even 
though, we posit the three discrete organizational archetypes of security bureaucracy, we 
recognize that a security bureaucracy continuum might as well be obtained, in which the 
three archetypes we discuss here are melded rather than transitioned to and from. As a 
last limitation, the evidence necessary to investigate and assess the ultimate security 
bureaucracy that we advocate, Security Superstructure will be hard to develop.  A 
qualitative inquiry, being largely phenomenological, is easy to conduct; one simply 
engages in anecdotal interactions with organizational citizens and learns from what they 
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say, abstracting this in further, admittedly anecdotal, exposition. The transition to 
empirical operationalization of the theoretical constructs we develop and offer for further 
research here will take work.  We anticipate challenges with operational measures of the 
Security Superstructure archetype, it being primarily cultural in nature. Culture is so 
much easier to assess as an anecdote than in precise quantitative measurement.   
This study provides guidance and direction for several avenues of future research.  
First, bureaucracy represents a typical organizational structure, frequently shown in 
structurally “tall” organizations, yet there can be different research results while 
investigating relatively “flat” reengineered organizational forms. It may be assumed that 
employees’ discretion to effect security solutions is broader in wide as opposed to tall 
organizational structural forms.   A second area of research guidance can thus be 
suggested:  to compare security implementation in different organization structures and 
superstructures. A third area of future research area can trace back to Child’s classic work 
(1972) about the impact of strategic choices on structural change. In other words, future 
work can be pursued in examining how executives or security committee’s strategic 
decisions influence the change of security bureaucracies and thereby proactively address 








In this chapter, the findings of three studies are presented, respectively. These 
findings were generated from a series of intriguing patterns and phenomena in the 
organizational context. These results, for the most part, meet the expectations developed 
at the outset of the dissertation process regarding the interplay of organizational factors 
and security activities. Much of what is learned is in accordance with the organizational 
theories and behavioral security theories upon which the work was based. Some of what 
is learned differs from initial expectations, which can lead to new directions of research. 
The specific results of each study follow, and research limitations and opportunities are 
provided.  
5.1 Summary of Dissertation Findings 
Study 1: Beyond Extra-Role Security Behaviors 
in Large Corporate Settings:  
The Case of “Tribal Security” 
 
The expectation at the start of Study 1 was that employees would go the extra 
mile beyond policy compliance requirements to help others in their workgroups. Yet, 
what was learned was that there are at least two different ways in which security is 
viewed in the firms, and only one of them is accessible to company management; the 
other is a workgroup level affordance in the interest of workplace expediency. Although 
the intention was to understand extra-role security behaviors, it was discovered instead 
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that formal and informal security cultures operated in parallel and in isolation from each 
other within the firm. As an organizing principle, the companies had a formal security 
structure explicated in the Information Security Policy, and this served as a formal 
governance mechanism. In the workgroup investigated, however, there was an informal 
“local culture,” which served to support workgroup efficacy and task cohesion.  These 
workgroup security norms were not always in direct accordance with top-line company 
policy. This represents a juxtaposition of the security culture of the intimate close-knit 
workgroup, characterized as a “Tribe,” in counterpoint to the formal security policies of 
the overall firm. Each of these approaches to information security in the firm is specific 
and well understood by its separate proponents, but the distinctions between the two are 
important to understand as an aspect of security governance in large and complex 
organizations, which diverse workgroup subcultures are likely to arise.  
Study 2: The Role of Internal Audit and  
User Training in Information Security  
Policy Compliance  
 
 This study examined the role of information security policy compliance and the 
role of IS auditing in identifying non-compliance in the workplace. It shows that 
enterprise risk management benefits from audits that identify technology users who either 
feel invulnerable to cyber threats and exploits or feel that workplace exigencies augur for 
expedient workarounds of formal cyber security policies. Implications for consideration 
of CyberComplancy and CyberSecurity Loafing expand the insider threat perspective 
beyond the traditional malicious insider perspective. This study characterizes 
CyberComplancy as a state of mind that arises when computer users, who feel their 
systems are invulnerable, either as an aspect of architecture of security implementations, 
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subsequently do not feel the need to take proactive and pro-security behaviors in their use 
of the systems. The users are motivated to engage in less cyber security diligence than the 
company would desire because they think that the systems the company provides are 
well-secured. This study also characterizes the notion of Cybersecurity Loafing to 
describe technically competent workers who take unauthorized but expedient steps 
around certain security policies in the name of workgroup efficiency.  
Study 3: Iron Cage or Iron Shield?  
A Study of Organizational  
Security Bureaucracies  
 
 The third study investigates how information security is enacted within 
organizations in the context of their specific organizational structures. An intriguing and 
important theoretical construct arises from this investigation – that of the security 
bureaucracy. The primary findings array in two ways: first, three separate and 
evolutionary stages of security bureaucracy archetypes are described along with their 
specific properties and security propensities. These archetypes, in their order of 
evolution, are Security Prototype, Security Structure, and Security Superstructure. 
The Security Prototype is a more static, technology-oriented, and structurally 
functional form of bureaucracy. IT arises from the coercive aspect of firms in their efforts 
to develop structured rules and guidelines for operation. The Security Structure archetype 
is an orthodox, well-established, yet highly coercive form of bureaucracy. It takes the rule 
structures from the Security Prototype stage and seeks to enforce them actively and 
fulsomely. The Security Superstructure archetype describes the stage of evolution in 
which firms expand beyond rule-based structures to enable employees to perform 
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security-related tasks proactively through acculturative mechanism of symbols, 
terminology, languages, and artifacts.   
5.2 Conclusions and Future Research 
The dissertation is intended, from different perspectives, to explore and explain 
the process of information securing in organizations through conducting three qualitative 
case studies. The research purpose of the studies suggests a potential shift in the 
epistemological paradigm of security practice from prevailing micro perspectives to an 
emergent macro perspective. The construct of “information-securing” proposed here 
details how organizations enhance the security of their information assets via multiple 
organization technologies and enhancements in managerial perspectives toward the 
development of security cultures in the firm. The information-securing perspective 
provides guidance and direction for several avenues of future research in which dualism, 
dynamism, and democratism should be acknowledged. Lastly, more macro studies, using 
either quantitative or qualitative methodology, are called for to complement the currently 
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